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THE FOREIGN SOURCE DOCTRINE: EXPLAINING THE
ROLE OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
Timothy K. Kuhner*

This Article brings much-needed precision to the debate over the
Supreme Court's use offoreign and internationallaw to interpret the
Constitution. The debate has been both imprecise, ignoring the
subtleties of the phenomenon at issue, and prematurely abstract,
jumping to theoretical and ideological levels without first looking to
establish the specifics. By focusing on the particular areas of
constitutional text subjected to foreign sources and the longstanding
lines of caselaw upon which the use of foreign sources builds, this
Article reveals that a doctrine has crystallized around the use of
foreign sources. The doctrine specifies the precise uses to be made of
foreign sources and the amount of authority to be bestowed upon
them, and, consequently, provides a foundation upon which sensible
theoretical and ideological inquiries could be based. In sum, this
Article tells a story that needs to be heard, exposes the constitutional
traditions underlying what is commonly but wrongly treated as a
practice of activist judges, and sets the stage for productive social
discourse on an important constitutionalpractice.
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The Supreme Court's use of foreign and international law to interpret
the Constitution has become a matter of great debate in many spheres.
Cases that were controversial solely on the basis of their holdings-such
as those restricting the application of the death penalty and those striking
down a state prohibition on homosexual sodomyl-have become doubly
controversial, even hated, because of the citations to foreign sources
which led to these holdings. As evidenced by calls for impeachment of
Justices employing foreign sources, 2 virulent dissenting opinions, 3 and
the Senate's vetting of Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts on this
topic prior to their confirmation, 4 the use of foreign sources in domestic
constitutional cases has truly struck a nerve. In fact, in May 2004, the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Constitution passed a
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. See Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court: House Members Protest
Use of Non-US. Rulings in Big Cases, MSNBC, Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
4506232/ (discussing Representative Feeney's calls for impeachment).
3. See infra Part I.
4. When questioned on the use of foreign law, Judge Roberts called it "a misuse of precedent"
and noted that "[in foreign law, you can find anything you want," implying that there were no standards
regarding which laws could be cited and for what purpose such citations could be made. Bill Mears,
Roberts Fields Senators' Queriesfor Second Day, CNN.CoM, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/
09/13/roberts.hearings/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (quoting Judge Roberts). The following
exchange between Senator Coburn and then Judge Samuel Alito also provides a typical example:
Senator Coburn: "[T]here's no reference at all to foreign law in terms of your obligations
or your responsibility .... And I personally believe that [resorting to the use of foreign
law is] an indication of not good behavior by a justice, whether it be a justice at an
appellate division or a magistrate or a Supreme Court justice."
Judge Alito: "I don't think that we should look to foreign law to interpret our own
Constitution.... I don't think that it's appropriate or useful to look to foreign law in
interpreting the provisions of our Constitution. I think the framers would be stunned by
the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of the countries of the
world."
U.S. Senate JudiciaryCommittee Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the U.S.
Supreme Court, 109th Cong. (2006), available at 2006 WL 53273 (questioning of Judge Alito by Sen.
Tom Cobum, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.).
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non-binding resolution seeking to curtail the practice:
[J]udicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United
States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or
pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments,
laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of
laws passed by the elected legislative branches of the United States or
otherwise inform 5an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of
the United States.
Despite the energy surrounding this topic, the debate has been
horribly inadequate for the tasks of comprehension and analysis. This is
the particular motivation for this Article: to provide the necessary
context for a productive debate to occur. Thus far, articles, public
commentary, and even dissenting opinions on the use of foreign sources
have systematically glossed over the precise context in which these
citations to foreign sources occur-particularly, the constitutional text at
issue and the prior caselaw interpreting that text; additionally, there has
been an overemphasis on competing theoretical and ideological concerns
which, absent proper contextualization, defy reason. Only by tracing the
development of caselaw interpreting the portions of constitutional text
that have led to the citation of foreign sources can the nature of this
phenomenon be understood and evaluated. After all, how can one assess
"judicial activism" without reference to the relevant constitutional text
and caselaw? How can one claim that our country will be taken over by
foreign law without looking to the caselaw and assessing precisely what
role foreign law has played, and how much weight it has been accorded?
Is it sensible to claim that our legal traditions are being eroded without
asking whether the use of foreign law is related to our constitutional
traditions? In sum, little attention has been paid to what is actually
happening and, consequently, the public debate is unlikely to generate
understanding, consensus, or introspection within society. Quite the
contrary: confusion and politicization abound.
This Article makes two major contributions to the interrelated goals
of understanding and evaluating the Supreme Court's practice of
consulting foreign sources in domestic cases. First, it provides the
necessary contextual background for an informed discussion by
grounding the issue of foreign sources in specific areas of constitutional

5. H.R. RES. 568, 108th Cong. (2004). Representative Feeney's non-binding "Reaffirmation of
American Independence Resolution" was originally introduced as H.R. RES. 97, 108th Cong. (2004).
For documents and a witness list regarding the hearing, see House Committee on the Judiciary,
Hearings, http://judiciary.house.gov/Heafings.aspxlD=27 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007). See also
Representative Tom Feeney, Sponsored Legislation, http://www.house.gov/feeney/
sponsoredlegislation.shtml (last visted Feb. I, 2007); Curry, supra note 2.
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text and caselaw interpreting that text. There is in fact a story to be told,
for the Court's use of foreign sources arose neither suddenly nor
randomly. Second, by synthesizing the relevant caselaw, this Article
reveals the salient features of the practice and shows that it has in fact
crystallized into a doctrine, which I hereby term the foreign source
doctrine. Understanding the terms of this doctrine proves useful for
testing several theories that seek to determine whether the use of foreign
sources is more of a legal phenomenon than a political one.
My thesis is that the use of foreign sources constitutes a well-justified
doctrine that builds on important traditions in the Supreme Court's due
process and cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence. I demonstrate
this through a narrow, context-specific analytical approach, which I
believe to be warranted by the simple premises of common law analysis.
In the course of this Article, it will become clear that the practice of
consulting foreign and international law in domestic cases cannot be
understood unless the Court's references to foreign law are
disaggregated-that is, examined in the specific context of the
constitutional text in question and the past opinions interpreting that
text. We should not, at least as a starting point, ask whether it is
appropriate for the Court to use foreign sources to interpret the
Constitution, but rather whether it is appropriate for the Court to use
foreign sources to interpret the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Copyright Clause of Article One, and so on.
Furthermore, the first track in analyzing this strand of jurisprudence
should not be ideological or theoretical-for example, whether vague
(and often misplaced) notions of sovereignty or democratic legitimacy
permit these constitutional choices 6 -but rather dutiful and relatively
This means the first task is to grapple with the
formalistic.
constitutional text itself and the cases that interpret that text.
Although I touch on the positions taken by members of Congress and
the Supreme Court, I do not in the course of this Article give due
consideration to the many broad views on foreign sources espoused by
legal academics. This is no accident, for these broad views cannot be
evaluated without the sort of context provided in this Article. I am
concerned with providing a detailed, case-specific analysis upon which

6. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 58 (2004) (discussing the problems of democratic legitimacy arising from allowing
foreign views to thwart domestic majoritarian views); John Yoo, Peeking Abroad?: The Supreme
Court's Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 387 (2004)
(arguing that even "some type of deference" to foreign decisions constitutes a "transfer [of] federal
authority to bodies outside the control of the national government.").
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an evaluation of broad theories can be based.
In terms of this Article's first contribution, I insist on and aim to
establish the following with regard to the foreign source doctrine:
Constitutional duty in a government of laws requires that the first
question about the practice at issue be whether such choices are justified
in terms of the caselaw upon which they build and the language of the
constitutional text they interpret. Once this aspect of the issue is fleshed
out, then it makes sense to move to the more abstract implications of the
Court's citations to foreign sources. This is not to say that theoretical
and ideological aspects of constitutional doctrine are unimportant.
Rather, it is to say that in order to be useful, the complex realms of
theory and ideology ought not to be invoked prior to rigorous
observation of the phenomenon at hand. Otherwise, theory will not
produce additional understanding, and this is, after all, the goal of any
theory. Once that elemental task of rigorous observation has been
conducted, then theoretical positions can be usefully focused on
particular lines of cases and sections of constitutional text in order to
increase knowledge and to make the debate intelligible and susceptible
to broad, principled participation. Otherwise, we enter the everenlarging realm of punditry and obfuscation.
In terms of this Article's second contribution, I show that beneath the
morass of sparring majority and dissenting opinions there lurks a
relatively consistent doctrine. The controversy has centered on the
Court's most recent citations to foreign sources. These came in Atkins v.
Virginia7 and Roper v. Simmons,8 which held unconstitutional the death
penalty in application to the mentally retarded and juveniles, and
Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down a state statute prohibiting
homosexual sodomy. 9 Collectively, these cases feature references to
foreign laws, international laws, and the positions of foreign bar
associations. Four attributes of these references to foreign sources must
be highlighted: first, they have occurred in purely domestic disputes, by
which I mean cases where no foreign parties, foreign territory, or
tangible extraterritorial effects were implicated;'
second, these

7. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding death penalty unconstitutional when applied to the mentally

retarded).
8. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding death penalty unconstitutional when applied to juveniles).
9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
10. Cases involving foreign relations, the war on terrorism, or international law are not examined
here because they are not fairly termed "domestic disputes." See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004) (discussing the legality of indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen pursuant to the war on
terrorism); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (facing the question of jurisdiction over the claims of
foreign nationals held at Guantanamo Bay); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (touching
on the Alien Tort Claims Act); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (construing the
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references have been made in order to ascertain the meaning of
constitutional language; third, references such as these have occurred
consistently in Eighth Amendment and Due Process cases; and, fourth,
such references build on language from constitutional caselaw dating
These four attributes elevate these
back over a hundred years.
references to the level of constitutional doctrine.
The most politically inflammatory (and legally questionable) aspect
of the Supreme Court's consultation of foreign sources is the context in
which the practice has repeatedly occurred: cases where foreign parties,
foreign territory, or matters of direct foreign concern are not implicated.
In contrast to such purely domestic cases, everyone expects the Court to
reference foreign or international law in cases concerning the meaning
of a treaty or the legality of extraterritorial conduct, for example." Most
people, legal commentators included, cannot fathom the relevance of
foreign law to domestic constitutional issues. Its relevance will,
however, become clear through an examination of the caselaw.
The foreign source doctrine holds that it is permissible to consult
foreign and international law and opinion in purely domestic cases
where the Court must determine whether the U.S. Constitution bans as
cruel and unusual or as a denial of due process a law or governmental
practice from which a plaintiff claims relief. The doctrine currently has
not yet been invoked by the Court for the purpose of lowering existing
constitutional protections or for the purpose of ruling that a potential
expansion of constitutional protections is unjustified. Rather, it has
served to buttress lines of constitutional analysis through which civil
rights protections have been strengthened. Within the doctrine's legal
foundation can be found a narrow class of hypothetical cases where
references to foreign sources could properly be used to lower civil rights
protections or to conclude that an expansion thereof is unwarranted.
This too will be explained in due course.
The foreign source doctrine is not one of those legal principles that is
clearly stated by the Court or grasped by commentators; however, its
existence is descriptively verifiable and normatively secure. By this, I
mean that finding the doctrine in the caselaw does not require
embellishment, and the doctrine is easily justified in terms of
Warsaw Convention in regards to airliner liability for a passenger's death). It is logical, under standard
precepts, that foreign or international law would arise in such matters. In the domestic cases examined
in this Article, on the other hand, standard precepts are disturbed by the Court's citation of international
and foreign laws.
11. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (involving foreign territory, foreign
nationals, and the Geneva Conventions); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692 (involving a foreign national, a
kidnapping on foreign territory, and a U.S. law that references the law of nations); Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371 (1998) (involving a foreign national and a treaty on consular rights).
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constitutional principles. The great enemy of the foreign source
doctrine, and the principal obstacle to its comprehension, is any acrossthe-board acceptance or rejection of foreign sources in constitutional
interpretation. By suggesting that foreign sources are always relevant or
never relevant to interpreting the constitution, some members of the
Supreme Court have erred. Such broad approaches to the issue tend to
appear as a "thick theory" premised on deep-seeded legal or social
assumptions. Broad approaches have been the most visible, despite
finding little support in the caselaw. Members of Congress, the Justices2
1
themselves, and commentators are prone to making such broad claims,
and have suggested that foreign and comparative analysis has no place
in the Court's jurisprudence or, conversely, that it may be central to the
future of U.S. constitutional law.
This Article is organized as follows. First, I discuss the caselaw at
issue, emphasizing the areas in which the Court has most frequently
used foreign materials-the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause. I also comment briefly on federalism and copyright law.
Second, by synthesizing these cases, I delineate the contours of the
foreign source doctrine and substantiate my thesis that foreign sources
have a legitimate role in interpreting certain, but not all, constitutional
provisions. Third, I offer several theories that seek to explain the
foreign source doctrine from the vantage point of the narrow approach
discussed. Fourth, I discuss how the broad positions taken by members
of the Court and the Congress could benefit from a narrower approach.
In conclusion, I discuss the importance of moving beyond the narrow
approach elaborated here and identify directions for future research.
I. ISSUE-BY-ISSUE ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S USE OF FOREIGN AND
COMPARATIVE LAW: DETERMINING THE NATURE AND PROPER SCOPE OF

THE FOREIGN SOURCE DOCTRINE

This Part of the Article presents the caselaw that defines the Court's
use of foreign sources in domestic cases. Discussion is mostly limited to
those cases in which the majority or plurality opinion employs foreign
sources, for it is this body of caselaw that gives shape to a widelyadhered to legal principle, a doctrine. 13
In the 1884 case of Hurtado v. California,the Court decided that the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a
12. See infra Part Ill.

13. Thus, I exclude from my analysis cases where a minority of Justices referenced foreign
sources. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (discussing
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).

1396

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW

[Vol.75

grand jury indictment in a felony prosecution.' 4 Most of the Court's
analysis addressed the meaning of "due process" in the Magna Charta
and Lord Coke's commentary on the same.' 5 The Court noted that
"owing to the progressive development of legal ideas" the words of the
Magna Charta acquired new meaning over time and that the document's
meaning had evolved by the time of the American colonies' separation
from England. 16 But despite this specification, the Court did not want to
fix the meaning of due process in this particular moment. Instead, it
rooted the meaning of "our 'ancient liberties"' in the "forms and
processes found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and
greater effect to modem ideas of self-government.' 17 The Court linked
the "true philosophy of our historical legal institutions" with the
18
common law's "flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation,'
and then went on to endorse the use of comparative law in constitutional
interpretation as, ostensibly, an element of that flexibility and capacity:
The constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by
descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of the English
law and history; but it was made for an undefined and expanding future,
and for a people gathered, and to be gathered, from many nations and of
many tongues; and while we take just pride in the principles and
institutions of the common law, we are not to forget that in lands where
other systems of jurisprudence prevail, the ideas and processes of civil
justice are also not unknown. Due process of law, in spite of the
absolutism of continental governments, is not alien to that Code which
survived the Roman empire as the foundation of modem civilization in
Europe, and which has given us that fundamental maxim of distributive
justice-suum cuique tribuere. There is nothing in Magna Charta,
rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and law, which ought
to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the
characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from
every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its
supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the

14. 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).

15. Id.at 521-32.
16. Id. at 529 ("[O]wing to the progressive development of legal ideas and institutions in
England, the words of Magna Chartastood for very different things at the time of the separation of the
American colonies from what they represented originally.").
17. Id. at 530 ("[Ijt is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the best securities for our
,ancient liberties.' It is more consonant to the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say
that the spirit of personal liberty and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and
developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms
and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and greater effect to modem ideas of
self-government.").
18. Id.
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new and various experiences of our own situation
and system will mould
19
and shape it into new and.. .useful forms.
Although the Court was here pushing to gain some space for
independent American meanings and experience separate from those of
the Mother Country and its laws, the philosophy of balancing the law's
fidelity to its own roots with openness to the best ideas of all systems
and various fountains of justice would remain relatively constant.
give
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, some fifty years later, would
20
enduring expression to this philosophy in Palko v. Connecticut.
In this 1937 case, the Court drew a line between rights that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus... valid as against
the states" and those that are not.2 1 In denying Frank Palko's claim that
he had been deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
by being tried twice for the same crime,2 2 Justice Cardozo offered a
"rationalizing principle" that serves as the criterion for determining
which side of this line any given right will fall: "[certain rights are not
part of] the 'very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty' [and therefore]
[t]o abolish them is not to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."' ' 23 In attempting to define such rights, Justice Cardozo
ventured that a "fair and enlightened system of justice would be
impossible without them.",24 Importantly, this opinion builds on the
tradition of grounding the meaning of Due Process in the context of our
nation's heritage and the broader traditions of civilized society in
relation to which we, even as we chart our own evolution as a distinct
polity, must continue to orient ourselves.
Fifty-one years later, Justice Antonin Scalia cited Palko in describing
the only sense in which he would take account of the practices of other
nations in interpreting the U.S. Constitution:
The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be
relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is
not merely a historical accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of
19. Idat530-31.
20. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
21. Id. at 325.
22. Mr. Palko was first convicted of second-degree murder, but later retried and convicted of
first-degree murder for the same act. Id. at 321.
23. Id. at 325.
24. Id.Justice Cardozo died the next year. Palko is one testament to his judicial philosophy, one
relevant aspect of which he gave to us in these words: "The great generalities of the Constitution have a
content and a significance that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees thru the transitory
particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them." BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921).
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ordered liberty" that it occupies a place25not merely in our mores but, text
permitting, in our Constitution as well.
To Justice Scalia, other countries' practices were relevant to the U.S.
Constitution only if those same practices and laws were already
uniformly observed by "our people." If so, then this coincidence
indicates that such practices and laws are essential to the scheme of
ordered liberty referred to by Justice Cardozo, and therefore deserving
of elevated constitutional status. In Justice Scalia's view, citations to
foreign laws are irrelevant unless those laws duplicate existing U.S.
provisions. One year later in 1989, this view commanded a majority of
the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky.26
The majority of the Court had taken a broader approach to foreign and
comparative legal analysis between Palko and Stanford. The broader
approach has regained prominence in the last four years through such
controversial cases as Atkins v. Virginia,2 7 Lawrence v. Texas,2 8 and
Roper v. Simmons.2 9 Yet, the effect of the Court's current, more
permissive use of foreign law and practice in constitutional
interpretation means different things in each of these cases. Lawrence is
a substantive due process case, while Atkins and Roper interpret the
Eighth Amendment. It is not surprising that the use of foreign law in
constitutional interpretation is an area of great confusion. Justice Scalia
imported a due process standard of analysis from Palko into the Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence through his majority opinion in
Stanford.
There are in fact four separate questions in play: First, in what ways is
foreign or comparative legal analysis relevant to interpreting the Eighth
Amendment? Second, in what ways is this same type of analysis
relevant to the task of interpreting the Due Process clause? The final
two questions are of less significance given the scarcity of case law:
whether such foreign and comparative analyses are relevant to
interpreting the federalist structure or the Copyright Clause. These

25. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency
that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici... that the sentencing
practices of other countries are relevant. While '[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other

democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely
a historical accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" that it occupies a place not
merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,' . . . they cannot serve to establish
the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people." (internal
citations omitted)).
27. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
28. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29. 534 U.S. 551 (2005).
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questions are examined here in the order described.
A. The Use of Foreignand ComparativeLaw to Interpret the
Constitution: The Eighth Amendment
1. Case Law
In Trop v. Dulles, decided in 1958, a plurality of the Court held that
30
the Eight Amendment prohibits expatriation as a form of punishment.
This is a landmark case, establishing that the contours of the Eighth
Amendment can be determined through reference to the practice of other
countries. Albert Trop was convicted of desertion by a military court
and sentenced to expatriation pursuant to a statute enacted by Congress
under its war powers. The Court remarked that the condition of
statelessness is "deplored in the international community of
democracies," citing a United Nations study. 3 1 The Court relied heavily
on the practices of other countries in finding an Eighth Amendment
violation: "The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity
32
that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime."
The plurality's rationale for considering the practices of other nations
in its interpretation of the Constitution emanates from a conception of
the Eighth Amendment recently reaffirmed by a majority of the Court in
2002.33 Though the Trop plurality conceded that the death penalty could
be imposed on deserters without offending the Eighth Amendment, it
noted that "the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the
Government to devise
any punishment short of death within the limit of
' 34
its imagination."
To determine the constitutionality of expatriation as punishment, the
plurality asked whether expatriation "subjects the individual to a fate
forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment. 3 5
The opinion specified that the Eighth
30. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Trop is the only case examined where the act in controversy occurred on
foreign soil. This Article examines uses of foreign and comparative precedent by the Supreme Court in
cases whose jurisdictional nature does not so require. This case is in fact no exception. As the plurality
stated, "[t]he fact that the desertion occurred on foreign soil is of no consequence. The Solicitor General
acknowledged that forfeiture of citizenship would have occurred if the entire incident had transpired in
this country." Id.at 92.
31. Id. at 102 (citing Study on Statelessness, U.N. Doc. E/I 112 (1949); Edwin M. Borchard, The
Diplomatic Protectionof Citizens Abroad, 32 POL. SCI. Q. 137 (1917)).
32. Id.
33. This more recent articulation of the Eighth Amendment's meaning will be discussed below.
See analysis of Atkins v. Virginia, infra notes 59-72.
34. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.
35. Id.
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Amendment "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society., 36 The plurality
defined this notion of civilized treatment in relation to the views of the
"civilized nations of the world," underscoring its view that the
fundaments of the Eighth Amendment relate to a broad concept of
human dignity: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man., 37 This language is truly
remarkable in that it posits that the Constitution ensures a measure of
dignity potentially transcendent of U.S. values. Indeed, the plurality
referenced the "Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice." 38 It
noted further that the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was a
direct transplant from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and
that the notion of human dignity derives from the Magna Charta.39
The plurality did consider that, despite the international consensus
regarding statelessness, some countries allow expatriation.4 Indissent,
Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Harlan quarreled with the
assertion that there was in fact an international consensus on the topic,
41
citing a competing portion of another United Nations document.
Notably, they did not quarrel with the plurality's mode of interpreting
the Eighth Amendment in reference to other nations' practices.
The method of Eighth Amendment interpretation outlined in Trop
achieved increasing acceptance by Supreme Court majority opinions up
until Stanford v. Kentucky in 1989.42 These opinions were handed down
4 4 and Thompson v.
in Coker v. Georgia,43 Enmund v. Florida,
Oklahoma.45 The Court held in Coker that the imposition of the death
penalty for rape violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. The majority discussed Trop's reference to

36. Id.at 101.

37. Id. at 100.
38. Id. ("The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of
Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.") (internal citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id.at 102-03 ("It is true that several countries prescribe expatriation in the event that their
nationals engage in conduct in derogation of native allegiance.... The United Nations' survey of the
nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey,
impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.") (citing Laws Concerning Nationality, U.N. Doe.
ST/LEG/Ser.B/4 (1954)).
41. See id.at 126 ("Many civilized nations impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in
designated prohibited activities.") (citing Laws Concerning Nationality, supra note 40).
42. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
43. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
44. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
45. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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other nations' practices only in a footnote and gave it limited effect: "It
is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world
surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape. ..., The
Enmund majority gave limited effect to Trop in this same regard in their
ruling that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the attribution of
culpability for a murder to accomplices who did not kill, attempt to kill,
or intend the killing to take place.4 7 They cited Coker's treatment of
Trop verbatim in a footnote where they characterized the abolishment
and restriction of
the felony murder doctrine in a range of countries as
"worth noting." 4 8
The full adoption of Trop's principles, specifically its conception of
the Eighth Amendment as tied to civilized standards of decency, came in
1988. The majority in Thompson discussed the views of "other nations
that share our Anglo-American heritage" and "leading members of the
Western European community," as well as those of a host of other
countries regarding the execution of juveniles and the death penalty in
general. 49 This discussion was characterized as strengthening the
Court's conclusion that "civilized standards of decency" would be
offended by executing someone who was under 16 years of age at the
time of their offense. 50 This discussion occupied over one page of text
in the Supreme Court reporter and included several footnotes, among
them a reference specifically to Trop. This is significant because the
discussion took place in the text of the opinion, rather than in a footnote,
and the citation was made directly to Trop, and only secondarily to
Enmund and Coker. In dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that "the views of
other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think
them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the

46. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (citing DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED
NATIONS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40, 86 (1968) (emphasis added).
47. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.

48. Id. at 796 n.22 ("'[Tihe climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a
particular punishment' is an additional consideration which is 'not irrelevant.' It is thus worth noting
that the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in
Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.")
(citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10) (internal citation omitted).
49. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 ("The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of
decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is consistent

with the views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations that
share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European
community.... The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The
Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as
treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the Soviet
Union.") (internal citations omitted).
50. Id. at 830.
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Constitution." '
One year later in Stanford v. Kentucky, a majority of five Justices held
that the Eighth Amendment allowed the execution of individuals for
crimes committed at sixteen or seventeen years of age. Though not
contrary to Thompson's holding on the merits, the Court's reasoning
differed in an important respect: Justice Scalia's view about foreign
experience prevailed. The petitioners' contention that execution in these
circumstances was contrary to "evolving standards of decency" was
rejected on the basis that "it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive. 5 2 To leave no doubt as to the meaning of this, Justice
Scalia spelled out that the Court "reject[s] the contention of
petitioners... that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant., 53 Justice Scalia's opinion implied that members of the Court
comprising the majority in the cases prior to Stanford had looked to the
practices of other nations simply because54they were consistent with
those Justices' own conceptions of decency.
Notably, this opinion defined cruel and unusual punishment in
relation to the practices accepted by the American people, stating in no
uncertain terms that the Court's job is "to identify the 'evolving
standards of decency'; to determine not what they should be, but what
they are."55 Also of note, it confined the relevance of other nations'
practices in determining whether a constitutional norm has reached a
high enough status to be valid against the States in the due process
context, as discussed by Justice Cardozo in Palko.56 In dissent, Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens (the Thompson plurality)
debated this point. They insisted that "the choices of governments
elsewhere in the world also merit our attention as indicators whether a
punishment is acceptable in a civilized society ' 57 and that such
"objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency" are
recognized as relevant by past Eighth Amendment cases.5 8
The Stanford dissenters' view became the law once again thirteen
years later in Atkins v. Virginia. Justice Stevens, the last Stanford
51. Id.at 868, n.14.
52. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 370 ("In determining what standards have 'evolved,' however, we have looked not to
our own conceptions of decency, but to those of modem American society as a whole."). This is the
sentence to which the footnote regarding foreign nations' practices was appended.
55. Id. at 378.
56. This second notable aspect of the case is therefore clearly dicta, since no due process
challenge was presented in Stanford,
57. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384.
58. ld.at 389.
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dissenter remaining on the Court, wrote an opinion joined by five other
justices holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of
the mentally retarded. Atkins establishes that Justice Warren's plurality
opinion in Trop is now the law. The Court reaffirmed that it is "nothing
less than the dignity of man" that underlies the Eighth Amendment and
that this portion of the Constitution "'draw[s] its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."' '59 At this point, early in the opinion, the Trop conception of
the Eighth Amendment had been reasserted, such that the reference to
foreign practice in footnote twenty-one came as no surprise: "[W]ithin
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved. 6 °
This is a humble citation to foreign law and practice. Aside from
being relegated to a footnote, the practices of the world community were
described as "by no means dispositive" and simply "lend[ing] further
support to [the majority's] conclusion that there is a consensus among
those who have addressed the issue [of capital punishment of the
mentally retarded].'
Moreover, the footnote at issue was attached to
the concluding sentence of a lengthy analysis of domestic legislative
changes since Penry v. Lynaugh, decided in 1989.62 The famous
footnote twenty-one of Atkins is in fact attached to the final sentence of
the material portion of the court's analysis. It reads: "The practice [of
applying capital punishment to the mentally retarded], therefore, has
become truly unusual,63and it is fair to say that a nationalconsensus has
developed against it."
Despite the limited practical effect of the majority's reference to the
world community (merely reinforcing an already existing national
consensus), a matter of principle is certainly implicated. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia wrote two dissenting opinions. The
59. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 10001 (1958)).
60. Id. at 316n.21.
61. Id.
62. In Penry, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court held that a congressional and state statute
prohibiting such executions, along with the rejection of the death penalty by fourteen U.S. states
provided insufficient evidence of the required "national consensus" against the practice. Id. at 334. The
Atkins opinion's lengthy analysis of legislative enactments since Penry occupies pages 314-317 of the
opinion. The Court's explanation for its holding at the outset of the opinion also characterizes domestic
legislative change as determinative. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 ("[lI]n the 13 years since we decided Penry
v. Lynaugh ... the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges have deliberated over the question
whether the death penalty should ever be imposed on a mentally retarded criminal. The consensus
reflected in those deliberations informs our answer to the question presented by this case.").
63. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
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primary message of each is that the views and practices of the world
64
community are irrelevant and contrary to the Court's precedents,
though the basis for this message varies between them. Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the "suggestion that [foreign laws] are relevant to
the constitutional question. . .isantithetical to considerations of
federalism., 65 He based this assertion on a passage in Stanford
expressing the need for rules binding on government to be facially
present in the laws approved by the people. 66 More poignant is Chief
Justice Rehnquist's rather sincere question as to why other countries'
Court is seeking to determine whether a
views are relevant if the
67
national consensus exists.
A more difficult portion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is that
He cites
regarding the proper function of international opinion.
Thompson, Enmund and Trop for the proposition that "some of our prior
opinions have looked to 'the climate of international opinion'. . .to
reinforce a conclusion regarding evolving standards of decency. 6 8 This
is a fair assessment. Then, as if to imply that the majority had
superseded this limited use of international opinion, he writes that "we
have since explicitly rejected the idea that the sentencing practices of
other countries could 'serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment
prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among our people.' 69 Justice
Scalia, who joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion and vice-versa,
clarified in his own dissent70 what is likely the message behind this
somewhat cryptic allegation.
Though part of Justice Scalia's criticism was directed at the
majority's citation to professional and religious organizations, he took
greatest exception to the survey of foreign nations' practices. He
characterized these methods as deserving of "the Prize for the Court's
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus,"' using capital

64. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

65. Id. at 322.
66. See id at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court's suggestion that these sources are
relevant to the constitutional question finds little support in our precedents and, in my view, is
antithetical to considerations of federalism, which instruct that any 'permanent prohibition upon all units
of democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative acts (laws and the application of laws)
that the people have approved."').
67. Id.at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I fail to see, however, how the views of other
countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court's ultimate
determination.... For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are looking, then the
viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.").
68. Id.at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
(alteration in original).
69. Id (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368 n.l)
70. Id.at 347-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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letters to emphasize his point.7 1 It was in fact necessary to frame his
objection in terms of an allegation of artifice, since the majority was
clear that its use of international opinion served only to determine what
is "unusual" and reinforce an existing national consensus (see above).
Justice Scalia then went on to state what is safely the most heated
objection to the Court's reference to foreign countries:
Equally irrelevant are the practices of the "world community," whose
notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people. "We
must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America
that we are expounding ... [W]here there is not first a settled consensus
among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened
to be, cannot be imposed upon
the Justices of this Court may think them
72
Americans through the Constitution."
Yet, even this fervent objection contains a limiting principle. Justice
Scalia implies that if there were a settled national consensus, then the
views of foreign countries could be taken into account. He stated this
openly in Thompson, confusing the Palko due process standard with an
Eighth Amendment standard.7 3 Of course, if there were a clear national
consensus, the views of foreign countries would presumably be
irrelevant, which is a restatement of Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern
above (regarding why the majority cited to foreign practice if it claimed
to be doing so only to support a national consensus it regarded as clear).
But the most significant use of foreign law would not surface for
another three years. In Roper v. Simmons,74 decided in March 2005, the
Court abolished the imposition of the death penalty on individuals who
were under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense. There,
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, devoted a full two pages of foreign law analysis
and jurisprudential commentary justifying the same.
The Court adhered to the basic Atkins rule of world opinion and
foreign law being useful for nothing more than lending support for
Court's pre-formed conclusion on the matter. The majority opinion
71. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
72. Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 n.4 ("The practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely
a historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not
merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well .... But where there is not first a
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of
this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.") (citing
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (internal citations omitted).
74. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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explained: "The opinion of the world community, while not controlling
our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for
our own conclusions. 75 This explicit, abstract statement seemed at first
glance a restatement of an earlier and more material portion of the
opinion, which reads as follows:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate for offenders
under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for76the
task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.
Thus far, the two statements match up. But in the very next sentence,
the Court continued as follows: "Yet at least from the time of the
Court's decision in Trop, the Court has referred to the laws of other
countries and to international authorities as instructive for its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and
unusual punishments."' 77 If foreign sources solely serve to confirm preexisting interpretations of the Eighth Amendment, one would not
describe such sources as "instructive for interpretation." This phrase
states that such sources aid the court in interpreting-thatis to say that
they help in the process through which the Eighth Amendment's
meaning is determined. Indeed, the term "instructive" relates to the
noun "instructions" and would thus seem to imply giving direction to,
orienting, or otherwise actively aiding in the interpretive process. This
formulation does indeed contest the idea of foreign sources in the
ancillary role of lending support, but not giving directions.
The Roper majority's analysis of foreign law dwarfs footnote 21 in
Atkins and will likely invite further doubt on the merely ancillary
function of foreign law. It does so not so much through detail, although
detail abounds, but rather through the type of detail emphasized and the
tone employed. "[I]t is fair to say," writes the majority, "that the United
States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the
juvenile death penalty., 78 A dispassionate formulation might not have
gone beyond the empirical: the United States is essentially the only
country not to abolish or disavow the juvenile death penalty. And yet,
the majority opinion does not merely tally the number of nations in favor
and against. Emphasizing the unsavory bedfellows the U.S. has made
by continuing the practice, it does more than this. It notes that Somalia

75. Id. at 578.
76. Id.at 575.
77. Id.

78. Id. at 577.
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is the only other country not to ratify the relevant provision of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and that even Iran, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
China (all of which having carried out such executions since 1990) have
since abolished or renounced the juvenile death penalty. 79 The majority
also discussed the United Kingdom's experience at length.80
The majority prefaced several portions of its analysis along these lines
by mentioning how respondents and amici had brought the information
to light. Although this suggests that the Court might not have thought to
unearth the information on its own, and thus seems to weaken the
jurisprudential value of the citations to foreign sources, one must
identify the amici before drawing this conclusion. Friends of the court
identified by name in the opinion include the European Union, Jimmy
Carter, a slew of former U.S. diplomats, and the Human Rights
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales. To name and entertain
within the text of an opinion the contentions of a supranational
government and a committee of a foreign bar in a case not involving
foreign parties, foreign territory, or a matter that affects any cognizable
foreign interests is to signal great openness to world opinion. Moreover,
the domestic actors cited-a former president and former diplomatsare known to be uniquely concerned with international opinion and the
process of reconciling U.S. policy with the same.
The majority, now self-conscious and aware of its place in a culture
war, took great pains to justify its approach to foreign law and opinion.
First, it offered a lengthy string of citations to past Supreme Court cases
taking the same approach. Second, the Court offered patriotic rhetoric
designed to respond to its critics and to win readers over to its approach.
"It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution," wrote Justice
Kennedy, "or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom., 8 1 This concept of a "heritage of freedom" places
the Eighth Amendment in that broader context advocated by the
majority.
Justice Stevens wrote separately simply to emphasize that the Eighth
Amendment must be interpreted in light of evolving standards of
79. Id.

80. The United Kingdom's experience was said to be of "particular relevance here in light of the
historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's own origins." Id. Indeed,
the Eighth Amendment itself is what comparative law scholars call "transplanted law," that is, law taken
from one cultural and legal environment and planted in another. It was copied almost verbatim from the
English Declaration of Rights of 1689. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377, 394-95 (1910).
81. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
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decency and is as such a living Constitution. He noted that, had its
meaning been frozen when first drafted, "it would impose no
impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today."8 2 This
principle was also affirmed by Justice O'Connor, although she
dissented.83
Justice O'Connor also affirmed the principle that foreign laws and
practices could be relevant to ascertaining the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. She did, however, put forth only qualified support for
considering foreign sources, noting that it was appropriate only in a
situation where a national consensus against the challenged practice had
already developed.84 Thus, she took a page from Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Atkins. 85
Justice O'Connor's opinion
demonstrates, however, that the majority view on the role of foreign law
and practice does not necessarily require that a human-rights restrictive
state law be overturned. Ever the bridge between the two polarized
halves of the Court, Justice O'Connor here exemplified a middle 86road
likely to be erased from the maps by her replacement, Justice Alito.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
vehemently sketched out the map likely to be asserted by the new
majority of the Court the next time a case arises with any bearing on
foreign and international opinion. More significantly, however, the
opinion attacks the larger philosophy of which the use of foreign law is
but one small implication: that the Constitution is a living document. It
is of course true that consultation of foreign laws could be considered an
originalist position, owing to the philosophies and practices of the
framers themselves. 87 But as a matter of jurisprudence, the use of
foreign laws has come to be associated with the activity of interpreting
the Constitution in light of evolving standards of decency or, in the due
process realm, a fundamental principle of justice,8 8 two notions that
Justice Scalia abhors for being read into the Constitution by the
82. Id. at 587 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
83. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("It is by now beyond serious dispute thatthe Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments' is not a static command.").
84. See id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Because I do not believe that a genuine national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty has yet developed, and because I do not believe the Court's
moral proportionality argument justifies a categorical, age-based constitutional rule, I can assign no such
confirmatory role to the international consensus described by the Court.").
85. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 305, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Chief Justice Roberts will likely have little bearing on the issue, as his views will likely
prove duplicative of those of his predecessor.
87. See Harold Hungju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT'L. L. 305, 308

(2001) (noting that "[i]n the early years of the American republic, when the United States was a'small
nation with almost no indigenous law, America was fundamentally a law-taker and a law-borrower.").
88. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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judiciary. He writes in Roper that "the only legitimate function of this
Court [in interpreting the evolving standards of decency] is to identify a
moral consensus of the American people." 89 Thus, he dissents on the
grounds that the majority has made "a mockery" of Hamilton's
expectation of a "traditional judiciary, 'bound by strict rules and
precedents,"' an expectation that justified life tenure for judges, who
90
were to have "'neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment."'
This mockery purportedly flows from the majority's pronouncement that
Stanford was correctly decided under the Constitution as it stood at the
time, but that the Constitution has changed in the intervening fifteen
years. Justice Scalia thus rejects the notion that the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment is to be construed in light of the evolving standards
of decency relied upon by the majority and emphasized in Justice
Stevens' concurrence.
Justice Scalia also attacked the rather monumental notions of judicial
review and the Supremacy Clause. "Worse still," he writes, "the Court
says... that what our people's laws say about the issue does not, in the
last analysis, matter." 9 1 He goes on to quote the majority's statement
that "in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment."
Clearly, the Supremacy clause and judicial review
squarely require that laws passed by the states can be reviewed by the
Court and trumped by the Eighth Amendment if a conflict arises, and
equally clear is the fact that the majority of the Supreme Court decides
how that short and vague text applies to any given state or federal law.
Also notable is that the dissenters claim to be able to distinguish
92
between force and will, on the one hand, and judgment on the other.
In noting that "the meaning of our Eighth Amendment... should [not] be
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and
like-minded foreigners," 93 they complicate matters by criticizing the
concept of subjectivity.
We know, objectively, that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, but past this point,
subjective views are required to interpret its meaning. The notion of
limiting oneself to judgment, and eliminating force, will, and
89. Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
91. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Alexander Hamilton assured that citizens of New York
that there was little risk in [giving life tenure to judges who could nullify laws enacted by the people's
representatives], since '[t]he judiciary... ha[s] neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment[.].')
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465).
93. Id.
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subjectivity begs for clarification. None is offered. The consequence is
that the very concept of judicial review is placed in doubt. If the written
law is intentionally vague in order to allow future generations to be
94
involved in self-rule, how can the judiciary "say what the law is"
without resort to subjectivity? The grand fallacy of originalism, which
is the cure implied by the dissenters, is that the founders intended their
own subjective views (those lurking behind the constitutional language
they did agree upon) to bind us,95 and, even if so, that those views could
in all cases be objectively determined with a sufficient degree of clarity
to apply to modem, unforeseen conditions.
With regard to the topic of foreign laws specifically, Judge Scalia and
company ignore the majority's explanation for consulting such laws, but
nonetheless dedicate nearly four pages in the Supreme Court reporter to
attacking the practice.
The dissenters at times lump the entire
Constitution together, instead of merely considering the Eighth
Amendment's text in particular, and describe the majority opinion as
allowing the views of foreigners to determine the meaning of the
Constitution, as opposed to addressing the question of whether such
views can confirm a conclusion about the Eighth Amendment already
arrived at through traditional channels. The dissenters construe the
majority opinion as stemming from the "basic premise... that American
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world., 96 Of course the
majority specifies an entirely different premise and thus we, the Court's
audience, are left with the distinct impression that although all nine
members of the Court work in the same building, they have not bothered
to carefully explain their views to each other. We are made to
understand that this particular issue of foreign laws' relevance to the
Constitution has generated
disagreement vehement enough to preclude
97
understanding.
mutual
2. Analysis
The debate in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is whether foreign
law and practice should be taken into account in interpreting the
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment. This must be underscored:

94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
95. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985).
96. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 628 ("The Court's parting attempt to downplay the significance of its extensive
discussion of foreign law is unconvincing.").
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The Court considers that practices of the world community can, in this
narrow area of law, help interpret the Constitution. Specifically, the
Court currently maintains that survey data regarding the types of
punishment employed in foreign countries can constitute supporting
evidence for the conclusion that a given type of punishment has become
"unusual." In the majority's own words, it utilizes such evidence not to
establish the existence of a national consensus, but rather as in
independent weight added to the scales only once a national consensus
has been established. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia believe
that such survey data is used to "manufacture" a national consensus,
where none exists per se.
It is difficult to imagine how the views of other countries could help
establish or manufacture a national consensus. The spheres of domestic
and foreign opinion are clearly demarcated and there is no danger of
confusing one with the other. Domestic opinion is ascertained through
the existence of legislation and, to a far more limited extent, the views of
domestic professional organizations cited in footnote twenty-one. Both
of these sources of information, though especially the former, are clearly
domestic in character. Citizens of foreign nations do not vote in our
elections or serve as state congressmen.
The true disagreement between the majority and the dissent lies in
their underlying conceptions of the Eighth Amendment. The majority
looks to 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,' an evolution towards the protection of human dignity,
and the Court's own judgment. These are among the "subjective
factors" that are considered along with the "objective factor" of
domestic legislative enactments by the states.
We.. .acknowledged in Coker that the objective evidence, though of
great importance, did not "wholly determine" the controversy, "for the
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment."
Thus, in cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is "brought
to bear" by asking whether there is reason98to disagree with the judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators.
Indeed, the Court stated that its "independent evaluation" leads it to
agree with "legislatures that have recently addressed the matter." 99 This
indicates that it is not the sheer number of legislatures at issue, but rather

98. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
99. Id. at 321.
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the direction of change. The Court concludes by recognizing that its
opinion is based on this evolutionary change towards greater human
dignity: "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of
our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such
punishment is excessive . "100 The law, as it now stands in the
Supreme Court, is that the practices of foreign countries can lend weight
to the conclusion that a practice is "unusual," or contrary to the evolving
standards that inform the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
This admonition by the Court that it construes the Eighth Amendment
in light of evolving standards and that foreign practices can help show
the direction of that change implicates former Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concerns about federalism. Unless the Eighth Amendment is to be
simply an objective survey of majoritarian preferences within the United
States and nothing more, positional federalists may be unsatisfied. The
Bill of Rights contains counter-majoritarian rights interpreted by unelected justices. This is the systemic architecture at hand. Aside from
the fact that few (if any) constitutional norms were enacted by the
present generation, the principle that the rules be "apparent" would seem
to be contravened by all constitutional principles whose interpretation
allows for broad judicial discretion-consider, for example,
jurisprudence in the area of the commerce power or due process rights.
There are important textual and historical justifications for the broad
approach to constitutional interpretation in Eighth Amendment cases.
"Cruel and unusual" is a comparative phrase. It begs the question,
"cruel and unusual compared to what?" Furthermore, as Chief Justice
Warren noted in Trop, the Eighth Amendment is based on a concept of
human dignity rooted in a broad historical tradition. Though many of
the Constitution's provisions were transplanted from pre-existing legal
traditions, not all of those provisions assume comparative or universal
functions. The meaning of "speech" or "slavery" in the Amendments is
not defined comparatively or in terms of a broader evolving conception
of civilized society (except insofar as the Thirteenth Amendment
substantively codified one such evolution).
The fact that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause is different from other clauses in the Constitution, both in terms
of its wording and its history, suggests the necessity for a narrow theory
of the constitutional role of foreign law and practice. It suggests the
permissibility of comparative analysis here, but it by no means justifies
the same in application to any other portion of the Constitution. Justice
Scalia assumes that an "all or nothing" rule must obtain in order for the
100. Id. at 320.
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Court to avoid sophistry. 0 1 He writes that "[t]he Court should consider
[the exclusionary rule, the Establishment Clause, and its abortion
jurisprudence] in light of the views of foreigners, or else it should cease
putting forth foreigners' views as part of the reasoned basis of its
decisions."' 10 2 Although this is, once again, good rhetoric calculated to
arouse the senses of Americans, it ignores the text of the Constitution as
well as a long line of cases that invite such comparison in certain areas
and not others.
In addition to the textual and historical justifications for this
approach, one finds important policy rationales for it. A results-driven
or "instrumental" reason for the Court's approach to international law
can be derived from a thought experiment. If the great majority of
legislatures across the country began authorizing disembowelment,
decapitation, and stoning to death as punishments for crime, it could
certainly not be said that these statutes could be evidence of "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'' 0 3
In such a case, the Court would have to look to the practices of other
nations to suggest that such treatment is cruel and unusual. If the
"dignity of man" is defined only in terms of how much dignity
Americans are willing to afford each other, then Justice Scalia's view is
internally consistent. However, if there is to be any limiting principle
(absent a substantive standard for cruel and unusual punishment), then it
must be permissible for the practices of other nations to be taken into
account. To say that such a thought experiment posits events so
unrealistic as to be a meaningless exercise is to ignore the potential for
tyranny of the majority. More concretely, such a view ignores recent
precedent.
In Ewing v. California10 4 and Lockyer v. Andrade,'°5 the Court
decided that neither a fifty-year sentence for stealing videotapes from
K-Mart nor a twenty-five-year sentence without the possibility of parole
for stealing golf clubs violates the Eighth Amendment. These holdings
posit that human dignity is not impermissibly compromised by the
practice of incarcerating people for the remainder of their lives for
06
stealing what amounts to half of the hourly fee of a corporate lawyer.'
Though the constitutionality of this practice certainly depended on the
101. Roper, 543 U.S. at 626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 627.
103. Id. at 551 (majority opinion).
104. 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (fifty-year sentence for stealing videotapes).
105. 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (twenty-five-year sentence for stealing golf clubs).
106. The value of the video tapes stolen by Andrade was $153.54. See Linda Greenhouse, "The
Supreme Court: Repeat Offenders, Justices Uphold Long Sentences in Repeat Cases," N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2003, at Al.
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absence of medieval style punishments describe above, these cases
demonstrate that the character of the national consensus will not
inevitably tend towards greater affirmation of human dignity. Given
this, it is fundamentally important (if one wishes to entertain resultsdriven reasoning) that the Eighth Amendment be capable of providing
greater protections than those agreed to by a majority of the citizens of
any given state.
B. ConstitutionalInterpretationContinued Proceduraland Substantive
Due Process Under the FourteenthAmendment
1. Case Law
Palko, discussed above, involved a procedural due process claim that
the Court evaluated by determining whether the right asserted was part
of a "'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental."", 10 7 If so, then a "fair and
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without [it],"' ' and
the right should be valid against the states. This basic approach is well
established in the Court's jurisprudence and has both controversial and
mundane applications. The mundane application can be seen in Clark0v.9
Arizona, the most recent due process case at the time of this writing.'
There, Justice Souter's majority opinion noted the various approaches to
insanity in traditional Anglo-American approaches, including two
nineteenth-century English cases, which gave rise to the multiple
standards maintained by the states.
This diversity of standards
compelled the majority to conclude that "no particular formulation has
evolved into a baseline for due process."1 0 This reference to foreign
law does not serve to discredit any existing rule maintained by any state.
The same cannot be said about two earlier due process cases whose
more aggressive use of foreign law has not been set aside by any later
decision.
Though Justice Scalia is the only member of the Court to propose in
the Eighth Amendment context that the practices of other nations could
help determine whether any given principle is in fact fundamental to our
concept of ordered liberty, 1 the first citations to foreign laws in the
107. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937).
108. Id.
109. 126 S.Ct. 2709 (2006).

110. See id. at 2722.
111. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 869, 821 n.4 (1988) ("The practices of other nations,
particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our
people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it

2007]

THE FOREIGNSOURCE DOCTRINE

1415

Fourteenth Amendment due process context appear to have come in Roe
v. Wade. 112 The effect, however, is the same. The Roe majority
employed a historical analysis of foreign laws to show that the abortion
laws in effect in the majority of U.S. states in 1973 were anomalous in
'our legal tradition.'
Striking down the prohibitions on abortion
required a finding that the right to abortion is a fundamental right
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, which Palko described as
part of our "traditions and conscience." ' 1 3 Given that most states
prohibited abortion at the time the opinion was written, the Court had to
show that such prohibitions were enacted in spite of our traditions, not
because of them.
The Court conducted a lengthy review of abortion laws throughout
history in part VI of its opinion. The review included a detailed survey
of (i) law, religion and philosophy of the Greek and Roman era, 114 (ii)
common law from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries,' 1 5 (iii) English
statutory law, 1 6 and (iv) the law in effect in the United States until the
mid-nineteenth century. 1 7 The Court began part VI of its opinion with
the following words:
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal
abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively
recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt
at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the
pregnant woman's life, are not of ancient or even of common-law origin.
Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in
occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well.").
112. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
113. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
114. Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-31 ("Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If

abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the
father's right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion .... Most Greek
thinkers... commended abortion, at least prior to viability.") (citing PLATO, REPUBLIC V, at 461;
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS VII, at 1335b 25).
115. Id.

at

132-33 ("It

is undisputed that at common law,

abortion

performed before

'quickening'-the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to
the 18th week of pregnancy-was not an indictable offense. The absence of a common-law crime for
pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical,
theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins.") (internal citations omitted).
116. Id.at 136 ("England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c.

58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, [in section] 1,a capital crime, but in [section] 2 it
provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the
'quickening'

distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision of 1828 .... It
disappeared, however, together with the death penalty, in 1837 ...and did not reappear in the Offenses
Against the Person Act of 1861 ...that formed the core of English anti-abortion law until the

liberalizing reforms of 1967.") (internal citations omitted).
117. Id. at 138 ("In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-19th century

was the pre-existing English common law.").
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the latter half of the 19th century. 118
This survey of foreign laws and practices contradicts Justice Scalia's
proposal, which would make such practices irrelevant unless those same
practices are already uniformly observed by "our people."
Yet, the logic of the Roe majority is consistent with Justice Scalia's
premise. If a practice uniform among Americans is also observed by
other nations that share our heritage, it does indeed follow that this
practice might not be a historical accident, but rather part of our
"concept of ordered liberty." If this is so, then it must also be true that
an American practice contradictory to long-standing traditions among
the nations that share our heritage and the people whose practices
informed the design of the U.S. common law architecture could be a
historical accident, especially if the American practice is a recent
phenomenon within this country's history. The implication is that a
recent U.S. practice inconsistent with our history and the practice of
nations similar to our own is probably not "so implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty that it occupies a place not only in our mores, but... in
our Constitution as well."' 19
In order to strike down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual
sodomy, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas 120 had to overrule Bowers v.
Hardwick.121 Its reasoning was not that homosexual sodomy is "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and therefore permissible,
122
but rather that Bowers, and indeed the Texas Court of Appeals,
erroneously made the opposite assumption-that is, that the prohibition
was solidly established within the values of "our tradition" and therefore
valid.
The Court characterized Bowers' treatment of the prohibitions on
homosexual activity as overstated and incomplete. 123 The Court
criticized the "sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the
history of Western civilization" as ignoring "authorities pointing in an
opposite direction."' 124 Itwent on to pronounce that "[t]o the extent
Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be
118. Id.at 130.
119. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 869, 821 n.4 (1988).
120. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
121. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
122. The Texas court that upheld the anti-sodomy statute had itself made reference to foreign
views, citing Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Roman Law. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
123. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more
complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger there indicated.
They are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.").
124. Id. at 572.
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noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere."' 125 In particular, the Court noted that several years before
Bowers, the European Court of Human Rights had struck down a law
prohibiting homosexual sodomy. 126 It described this decision as "at
odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was
insubstantial in our Western civilization., 127 The Court went on to cite a
brief from Mary Robinson, then serving as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, detailing other nations' protections of
homosexual conduct. In light of this, it concluded that "the right the
petitioners seek. . .has been accepted
as an integral part of human
128
freedom in many other countries."
2. Analysis
The parallels between this analysis in Lawrence and the Court's
undermining of the prohibition on abortion in Roe are striking, but so is
one key difference. The Lawrence opinion does not argue that the
prohibition of homosexual sodomy is out of sync with our tradition and
heritage, as defined in Roe via reference to the Greeks and Romans, and
the common law tradition. Rather, it establishes that European nations
disagree with the holding in Bowers, and that the values expressed in
Bowers are not currently shared by "a wider civilization," 12 9 nor were
they at the time of the decision. Despite this temporal shift, the
underlying use of survey data from other nations' practices remains the
same as in Roe: to show that the prohibition at issue does not emanate
from a "'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ' 130 And even more
narrowly, the primary purpose of the citations to foreign practice is
clearly described as that of undermining Bowers' premise.
The truly important shift that occurred in Roe and Lawrence away
from the reasoning in Palko relates to whether foreign practice can be
used to undermine a prohibition or establish a right. Palko used the
concept of "our tradition" and wider civilization to distinguish between
rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus.
125. Id. at 576.
126. Id. at573.
127. Id.
128. Id.at 598.
129. Id. "Civilization" here of course must be understood as a narrow use of the word, referring
only to nations sharing "our tradition." Consider the significance of these words in Palko and Roe,
discussed supra at notes 113-119.
130. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)).
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.valid as against the states" and those that are not. 3 ' As the Court
recently held in Washington v. Glucksberg, rights "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition" cause the governmental prohibition on
that right to be subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny under substantive
due process analysis. 132 This notion was evident already in Palko. The
Roe and Lawrence opinions, on the other hand, focused on showing that
certain prohibitions enacted by the states were not rooted in any such
tradition, or in the case of Lawrence, are not now rooted in any current
tradition, and are therefore not owed the same degree of deference.
Justice Scalia appeared to realize that this shift had occurred. In dissent,
he correctly noted that Bowers "rejected the claimed right to sodomy on
the ground that such 3a3 right was not 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.""
The Court's statement of its obligation in Lawrence shows the shift
away from Palko and illustrates one motive for Chief Justice
Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's concerns: "Our obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."' 134 This
articulation is strikingly similar to one in Atkins: "Thus, in cases
involving a consensus, our own judgment is 'brought to bear'. . .by
asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by
the citizenry and its legislators.' 35 This judicial willingness to stray
from majoritarian moral codes or the preponderance of legislative
enactments constitutes the heart of each opinion.
In light of this core attribute, concern over the role of foreign and
comparative law in U.S. federal question cases becomes obvious. If the
justices are not bound by the will of the majority, they may seek to
enshrine within the Constitution foreign standards of human rights
protection. It was in this vein that Justice Scalia questioned the
majority's premise that Bowers relied on "the views of a wider
civilization, ' 36 and expressed concern that the Court was "'impos[ing]
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans. '137 This 8 quote could
3
essentially be read into the Feeney Resolution cited above.'
At most, however, this concern finds qualified textual justification in
Atkins and Lawrence. In the former, foreign practices were cited in a
131. Id.

132. 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
133. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first emphasis added).
134. Id. at 579 (majority opinion).
135. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002).
136. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598.
137. Id. (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.*(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari)).
138. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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footnote as "additional evidence... that [national] legislative judgment
reflects a much broader social... consensus."' 39 In the latter, foreign law
was cited as factual evidence that an earlier case, Bowers, relied on a
faulty premise. In each case, therefore, the Supreme Court looked to
foreign laws and practices to satisfy legal standards inherent in the
Constitution: evolving standards of decency and whether something is
considered "unusual" in the former, and this nation's societal
underpinnings in the latter. The use of foreign and comparative law in
each instance can be construed broadly or narrowly, but is most certainly
construed narrowly in the opinions themselves.
C. Two Variations:Federalismand Copyright
1. Federalism
In Printz v. United States,140 the Court found foreign experience
irrelevant to the task of determining the relationship between the
Commerce Clause and the principle of state sovereignty. The majority
opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, noted that "[b]ecause there is no
constitutional text speaking to this precise question [whether
congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is
unconstitutional], the answer. . .must be sought in historical
understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in
the jurisprudence of this Court."' 4 1 Justice Scalia, in response to
Justices Breyer's and Stevens' dissent, labeled comparative analysis
"inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution," though he
recognized that this same judgment would not apply to the process of
writing a constitution.142 To defeat the value of comparative analysis on
this issue, he ventured
that the systems the dissenters proposed to
143
different.
are
compare
The dissenters suggested that despite differences between our system
and others' systems, foreign experience "may nonetheless cast an
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common
legal problem."' 144 In the view of the dissent, the Court can consider
foreign experience while remaining faithful to the task of "interpreting

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 905.
Id. at 921 n.l.
Id. ("The fact is that our federalism is not Europe's.").
Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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our own Constitution."'
The Court's unwillingness to examine foreign practice in this
particular area of law is consistent with its recent decisions in Atkins and
Lawrence. First, there is nothing in the substantive law surrounding the
Commerce Clause or state sovereignty that openly invites comparative
analysis. Recall that the Eighth Amendment incorporates a comparative
standard of "cruel and unusual," which but for its constituent criteria of
evolving standards of decency and human dignity might invite only
domestic comparisons. Similarly, the Due Process Clause incorporates
standards that require the Court to determine in any given case the
meaning of a fundamental principle of justice rooted in our traditions
and whether a "fair and enlightened system of justice" could exist
without a certain right.146 These standards not only invite, but seem in
fact to require comparisons to foreign experiences. As was the case in
Printz, no constitutional text speaks precisely to homosexual sodomy,
abortion, or capital punishment; however, longstanding substantive
constitutional law warrants the comparative approach in these areas.
Second, these two areas of law where foreign sources have been
deemed relevant by the Court, albeit in a very narrow sense, are located
within the Bill of Rights. It apparently bears repeating that these rights
are intended to limit the reach of majoritarian politics, to defend the
individual from the government. The Court's posture in this area of law
should emphatically be that taken in Atkins and Lawrence.147 The
federalism question in Printz, on the other hand, involved structural
issues of economic and national policy more than rights. Judicial
discretion is less appropriate in such questions, except as required to
uphold the Constitution's commands. This is why the following case is
wrongly decided.
2. Copyright
In Eldred, seven Justices joined an opinion upholding the expansion
of the 'limited monopoly' of copyright an additional twenty years
beyond the life of the author. The Court held that the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 did not violate the "limited times" requirement in
the Copyright Clause. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that

145. Id.

146. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
147. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002) ("Thus, in
cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is 'brought to bear' by asking whether there is reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.").
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"[t]he Congress shall have the power... [t]o promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." 148 Under already-existing law, 149 copyrights generally
lasted from the time of a work's creation to fifty years after the author's
death. The Court afforded great deference to Congress' interpretation of
the "limited times" requirement. That interpretation is clear: Unless a
law grants literally infinite temporal protection to copyright, then it is
constitutional.
Of interest for the present analysis is the presence of two independent
textual requirements in the Constitution on point: First, copyright
protection must serve to promote art and science; second, exclusive
rights must be temporally limited. If continuous fixed-term expansions
for rights that already last well beyond the death of the author can hardly
be said to incentivize creation (or the "progress" of the arts) and nor can
granting additional rights to already copyrighted works, much less can
they be said to conform to any reasonable understanding of "limited
times." 15 0 If limited times is not to be measured by human lifespan and
if the fact that no person on earth will live to see certain copyrighted
material come into the public domain is immaterial, then surely this
constitutional requirement has been eviscerated.
The reason for discussing these two affirmative constitutional
commands is that they contradict the substance of the foreign laws and
practice relied upon by Congress in drafting the Act and by the Court in
interpreting its provisions. The opinion notes that "a key factor in the
[Act's] passage was a 1993 European Union (EU) directive instructing
EU members to establish a copyright term of life plus 70 years."' 15 1 The
Court then goes on to cite a law review article for the proposition that
"[m]atching th[e] level of [copyright] protection in the United States [to
that in the EU] can ensure stronger protection for U.S. works abroad and
avoid competitive disadvantages vis-A-vis foreign rightholders.' ' 2
Congressional intent behind the legislation did indeed aim to harmonize
American laws with European laws, but it remains unclear why
congressional intent to consult foreign laws should trump clear textual
148. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
149. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
150. Query whether such a use of foreign law results in a determination of constitutional meaning
cognizable by an understanding of original intent. See Reaffirmation of American Independence
Resolution, supra note 5.
151. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003).
152. Id. at 206 (quoting Shira Perlmutter, Participationin the InternationalCopyright System as a
Means to Promote the Progressof Science and the Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 330 (2003))
(alterations in original).
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language in our Constitution.
After all, the relevant European
constitutions might not have contained the same limitation as our
Constitution.
Thus, seven members of the Court relied on foreign law and practice
to uphold the validity of legislation under the First Amendment and the
Copyright Clause, despite the fact that the Constitution clearly points in
the opposite direction from foreign law and practice. Justices Breyer
and Stevens dissented-Justice Breyer on the express grounds that "in
this case the justification based upon foreign rules is surprisingly
weak," 153 and both Justices in response to
the injury caused by the Act to
154
affirmative constitutional requirements.
That the two greatest proponents of the relevance of foreign law and
practice dissented and the two greatest opponents joined the majority
opinion shows rather conclusively that no broad theory of the
Constitution's relationship to foreign laws can be identified. Consider
that Justice Scalia had claimed in Thompson that the practices of other
nations were relevant only after a domestic consensus was completely
formed. Here, however, he has allowed foreign laws not observed by
our people to motivate a reinterpretation of our own Constitution's
"limited times" command.
II. THE FOREIGN SOURCE DOCTRINE: SUMMARY AND TYPOLOGIES

The cases show that citation to foreign sources in domestic cases has
become a consistent enough and principled enough process for it to be
labeled a doctrine. Part I has illustrated the following general contours
from which more specific detail must be extracted: references to foreign
sources have occurred in cases where no foreign parties, foreign
territory, or tangible extraterritorial effects were implicated (i.e.,
domestic disputes) 5 5; second, these references have been made in order
to ascertain the meaning of constitutional language; third, they have
occurred consistently in Eighth Amendment and Due Process cases; and,
153. Id. at 257 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
154. Id. at 223-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id.
at 242-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Cases involving foreign relations, the war on terrorism, or international law are not examined
here because they are not fairly termed "domestic disputes." C.f Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) (discussing the legality of indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen pursuant to the war on terrorism);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (facing the question of jurisdiction over the claims of foreign
nationals held at Guantanamo Bay); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (touching on the
Alien Tort Claims Act); and Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (construing the Warsaw
Convention in regards to airliner liability for a passenger's death). It is logical, under standard precepts,
that foreign or international law would arise in such matters. In the domestic cases examined in this
Article, on the other hand, standard precepts are disturbed by the Court's citation of international and
foreign laws.
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fourth, they predate the recent cases around which controversy has
centered.
In this part of the Article, I distill the particular contours of the
doctrine from the caselaw. To do so, I turn to three basic and essential
questions, the answers to which delineate the foreign source doctrine
itself. First, exactly what types of foreign sources are currently
considered relevant in domestic constitutional cases-foreign opinion,
other countries' domestic laws, customary international law, treaties, the
precedents of international courts, perhaps others still? Second, does it
matter for purposes of consulting foreign sources what provision of the
Constitution is at issue? Third, how much authority is granted to foreign
sources (binding, persuasive, confirmatory, or merely rhetorical and
symbolic)? This third question seeks to understand the functions
fulfilled by foreign sources.
A. Types of Foreign Sources Consulted
The doctrine allows for three basic types of foreign sources to be
consulted: foreign law, international law, and foreign opinion. (1)
Foreign law refers to the decisions of the domestic courts and legislative
bodies of other states (nations). (2) International law refers to treaties,
customary international law, general principles of law common to
civilized nations, and the decisions of courts that have jurisdiction over
disputes between nations.156 The aspect in which the foreign source
doctrine is a misnomer is revealed here, as some international law is not
a foreign source at all, but rather a "part of our law."' 15 7 Much
international law cited by the Court, however, is indeed a foreign source
because it is non-binding on the United States. Consider, for example,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States has
not ratified, and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
which lacks jurisdiction over events on U.S. soil. Yet even if part of our
158
law, international law still generally emanates from a foreign source.
(3) Foreign opinion refers to the views of any non-U.S. based actor. The
following chart lays out each type of foreign source and a sample of
cases in which each source was consulted.

156. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.
157. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
158. This statement holds true in 99% of cases, although some international law, such as that
derived from general principles of law common to civilized countries could emanate from a provision of
the U.S. Constitution common to many major constitutions.
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Foreign Law

International
Law

Foreign
Opinion

8 th Amend
-Foreign states'
laws regarding the
imposition of
statelessness or
denationalization
as punishment
(Trop)
-Survey of
foreign death
penalty practices in
relation to rape,
mentally retarded
defendants, and
juvenile defendants
(Coker, Enmund,
Thompson, Atkins,
Roper)
-United Nations
Convention on the
Rights of the Child
(Roper)
-Three treaties
including 1949
Geneva
Convention
(Thompson)
-United Nations
study on
statelessness
(Trop)
-Amicus curiae
brief from
European Union
(Roper)
-Amicus curiae
brief from the
Human Rights
Committee of the
Bar of England and
Wales (Roper)
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1 4th Amend
-Review of
abortion laws
throughout
history (Roe)
-Foreign
countries
permitting
homosexual
sodomy
(Lawrence)

Copyright

-EU Court of
Human Rights
(Lawrence)

EU directive
instructing
member
countries to
establish long
copyright term
(Eldred)

-Amicus curiae
brief from Mary
Robinson, UN
High
Commissioner for
Human Rights
(Lawrence)
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B. Areas of Law in Which the DoctrineApplies-the Importanceof Thin
Theory andIssue-by-Issue Analysis
The foreign source doctrine applies only to Cruel and Unusual
Punishment and Due Process cases for two reasons: these portions of
constitutional text are open-textured, and long-standing judicial
interpretations of these portions of Constitutional text invite the
consideration of foreign sources. Both of these conditions do not hold
true for the Copyright Clause or matters of federalism, and it remains an
open question whether these conditions might hold true for some other
part of the Constitution in relation to which foreign sources have not
been invoked by the Court. 5 9
With regard to the first condition, much of the Constitution consists of
open-textured language, or language whose meaning is not clear from
the words alone. By way of example, "cruel and unusual punishment,"
"due process," and "for limited times" stand in stark contrast to "the
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State"' 60 or "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."' 6' The
meanings of the first group of phrases are arguably open to
reinterpretation without amendment, whereas the meanings of those in
the second group are not.
With regard to the second condition, the Court has, over the years,
defined the meaning of some pieces of open-textured constitutional in
terms that invite consideration of foreign sources. This is indeed a
process, for it has not been the case-at least not outside of the context
of the Copyright Clause-that Supreme Court Justices are willing to
consider foreign sources without having prior judicial interpretations of
the relevant provision on which they can build and upon which they can
justify their choice. In this respect, it makes little sense to discuss the
citations to foreign sources in Eighth Amendment cases without
grappling with the caselaw that links it to human dignity and "evolving
162
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'5
Similarly, it is a poor discussion that brings up such citations in the Due
Process context without regard to the caselaw linking the definition of

159. This is an area for future research, as an examination ofjudicial interpretations of all areas of
constitutional text (e.g., evolving standards of decency in relation to "cruel and unusual punishment") is
beyond the scope of this Article.
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.1.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
162. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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rights included within due process to "a principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental"'' 163 and without which a "fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible."' 64 All of these formulations square with
the notion expressed in Hurtado that our legal heritage, referring to the
Magna Charta and the common law, does not "exclude the best ideas of
all systems and of every age" and does in fact "draw its inspiration from
every fountain of justice. 165 Indeed, referring to our legal heritage, the
1819 case of Bank of Columbia v. Okely described the words of the
Magna Charta as embodying the "good sense of mankind" about the
need for individual freedom from the arbitrary exercise of governmental
power.166 It is worth noting that the right to due process and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as well as the notion
of a written constitution, were legal transplants from this document.
It should not then be a surprise that after approximately 140 years of
noting the relevance of great traditions inclusive of foreign experience,
the Court would in 1958 finally consider foreign sources within the text
of an opinion. As summarized in Part I above, the seeds of the foreign
source doctrine can be found throughout our nation's legal history, but
these seeds did not bear fruit until Trop v. Dulles. The Trop plurality's
embrace of foreign sources in cruel and unusual punishment cases took
hold in Coker, Enmund, and Thompson, was then rejected in Stanford,
67
later reaffirmed by Atkins in 2002, and now cemented by Roper.
Although the foreign source doctrine is not applied as frequently in due
process cases, there is no doubt about its application there, given Roe,
Lawrence, and even Clark.168 However, the purpose, extent, and effect
of the citations to foreign sources are not the same in these two separate
areas of law or even within different cases within the same area, as will
be discussed in section C, below. The point of emphasis here is simply
that the foreign source doctrine has a robust foundation in portions of
our constitutional text, the earlier document from where this text was
borrowed, the legal tradition of the common law, the Court's early
interpretations of our legal heritage, and the Court's interpretation of
cruel and unusual punishment and due process specifically. Key
163. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
164. Id.
165. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
166. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 243 (1819) ("[T]he good sense of mankind has at
length settled down to this: that [the words of the Magna Charta] were intended to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice.").
167. See supra Part l.A.
168. See supra Part I.B.
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moments in this historical evolution can be depicted as follows:

Legal origin

Supreme Court's
view of the
Magna Charta

Linkage of
constitutional
text to a greater
tradition

Freedom from
cruel and unusual
punishment
English Declaration
of Rights of 1688
and Magna Charta
(See Trop)
-Embodies the
"good sense of
mankind." Bank of
Columbia v. Okely
(1819)
-- Open to the "best
ideas of all systems
and of every age"
and the common
law process, which
"draw[s] its
inspiration from
every fountain of
justice." Hurtado
v. California
(1884)
"[D]erives its
meaning from
evolving standards
of decency that
mark the progress
of a maturing
society" and
outlaws "fate[s]
forbidden by the
principle of
civilized treatment"
as defined in
relation to the
views of "civilized
nations of the
world." "The basic
concept underlying

Right to due process

Magna Charta (See
Hurtado)

Same

The right is protected
if part of a "principle
ofjustice so rooted in
the traditions and
conscience of our
people as to be ranked
as fundamental," that
is a right without
which a "fair and
enlightened system of
justice would be
impossible." Palko v.
Connecticut (1937).
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Greater tradition
gives way to
consideration of
foreign sources

the Eighth
Amendment is
nothing less than
the dignity of
man." Trop v.
Dulles (1958)
(plurality opinion
echoed essentially
verbatim in Atkins
(2002)).
Trop v. Dulles
(1958)

[Vol.75

Roe v. Wade (1973)

(PASSAGE OF TIME, COMMON LAW EVOLUTION)

The foreign source doctrine formed through this combination of opentextured constitutional text, subjective judge-made law, and objective
historical linkages between certain constitutional protections and
The doctrine then
broader legal and philosophical traditions.
crystallized with relatively consistent insistence on foreign sources
leading up to the recent high-profile cases reaffirming it in Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment cases.
Any understanding of (or debate about) foreign sources is incomplete
if it does not take cognizance of the doctrine's origins in legal history
and specific areas of jurisprudence defining our constitutional text in
terms of greater legal and philosophical traditions. The doctrine is not
capricious; rather, it is part of a long-standing practice of linking our
constitutional traditions of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment law to the
broader projects of human dignity, fairness, justice, and individual
freedom from governmental oppression. This practice, expressed in
Palko and Trop and reaffirmed in recent years, seeks to both safeguard
and define our rights through contextualizing them in principles and
traditions that transcend the comparatively superficial concept of
nationhood. It is notable, however, that this practice does not occur
uniformly in constitutional law and is robust only in the areas of law
discussed here.
Indeed, citations to foreign sources are aberrational or non-existent
outside of the settings of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. The
majority's reference to European Union Copyright laws in Eldredwould
not have occurred but for the intention of Congress. Moreover, that
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reference did not build on any past cases or constitutional text that
invited consideration of foreign sources. It was sensible for the Printz
majority to refrain from consulting foreign sources, since no
constitutional provision or past caselaw invited the comparison. Of
course, nothing prohibited foreign comparisons either. The propriety of
citation to foreign sources in Roper, on the other hand, generates from
the actual constitutional text-"cruel and unusual" does seem to invite
comparison as does the long line of cases insisting on human dignity as
the foundation of the Amendment itself. The same can be said of Roe
and Lawrence, given the open textured language at issue and the caselaw
interpreting it. In sum, the Copyright Clause and matters of federalism
are not included within the foreign source doctrine because in these
areas of constitutional law there is no widely-adhered-to legal principle
pertaining to foreign sources. The fact that Congress might invite or
mandate comparisons to foreign sources, as in the case of Eldred,
matters little for the judicially-determined foreign source doctrine. In
comparison to the Copyright Clause, widely-adhered-to legal principles
counseling the consideration of foreign sources do exist in the areas of
Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Although the doctrine
might also have taken root in other open-textured constitutional
provisions that could be connected with the broader tradition of keeping
individuals free from arbitrary governmental power, a foundation of
caselaw has not been laid. Still, there is nothing to suggest that it could
not eventually be laid, as in the case of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures."
But any
innovations in the use of foreign sources would require many decades of
common-law development in order to claim the sort of legitimacy
possessed in other contexts. Let us now turn to questions of authority
and usage.
C. Authority and Uses of Foreign Sources
1. Linking Authority to Usage
It is logical, given our American legal socialization, to ask whether
the foreign source is authoritative or, on the other hand, cited simply
because it is persuasive. 169 The following graph depicts the various
169. See Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws: The Court Should Never
View a Foreign Legal Decision as a Precedent in Any Way, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 40,
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/printerfriendly.msp?id=589.
Not even Justice Scalia alleges
that the Court has treated foreign law as binding precedent, but foreign law could nonetheless be treated
as having some precedential authority on the basis of a status accorded to the foreign court that decided
the case. If this were the case, the situation would be analogous to a federal court of appeals weighing
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levels of authority that might be granted to foreign sources:
Degrees of Authority Illustrated in Terms of
Traditional American Conceptions
4

3

2

I

Special Status-Authoritative Precedent (e.g., the
holding of a superior court or prior case law of same
court as in the cases of (a) an en banc court of appeals
case for that same court of appeals, or (b) a Supreme
Court case for the Supreme Court or any lower
court). 70
Special Status-Non-binding but Relevant Precedent
(e.g., a federal court of appeals' discussion of a case
from a different federal circuit)
No Special Status-Persuasive Authority (as in the
case of a law review or treatise that influences the
analysis)
No Special Status-Mere Ornament (e.g., law review
article, treatise, case, or quotation of some notable
individual-anything really-used merely as additional
weight for or colorful illustration of a proposition
already arrived at by the Court)

The authority granted to foreign sources is, if we are to believe the
words of the majority opinions employing the doctrine, quite limited.
This limitation owes to the narrow category of uses approved for foreign
sources by Supreme Court caselaw. 17 1 The relationship between usage

the decision of another circuit. If foreign law is cited merely because of its persuasiveness, however,
and not its precedential value, this does not necessarily mean that we are then in that most
inconsequential realm that Professor Yoo calls an ornamental use of foreign law. If the Court gives the
foreign source the weight of a law review article or a treatise, it does not follow that the citation is
merely ornamental even if the citation does not single-handedly change the outcome of the case. While
an ornamental citation is mere window dressing, a way of indicating broader agreement with the Court's
independent conclusion, a persuasiveness citation indicates that the source in question provided the
Court with actual guidance in reaching its conclusion, even if the conclusion could not have been
reached on the basis of the citation alone. In such a case, the relevant question is whether the foreign
source was cited because of the independent value and persuasiveness of its reasoning, or because of a
special status afforded by our Supreme Court to the foreign court rendering the decision or to the foreign
body of law itself.
170. I do not mean to enter into the many variations on this theme (for example, to go on to list all
the possible permutations of this category, or to explore the fact that the Supreme Court can overrule
itself). The point is merely to delineate a category of precedent that is taken extremely seriously and
will in all but the most exceptional cases be followed to the letter.
171. Namely, to help determine whether (1) a given practice is unusual, or contravenes evolving
standards of decency and human dignity, and (2) whether it contravenes a fundamental principle of
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and authority, while interesting in the abstract,1 72 will be considered only
in the particular.
With regard to the U.S. Constitution, matters of usage and authority
of foreign sources are implicit, and pre-established usages constrain
authority.
Examining a contrasting example illustrates the point.
Authority and usage can be bestowed upon foreign sources by explicit
constitutional text, as in the case of the South African Constitution:
Interpretation of Bill of Rights
39. (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
b. must consider international173law; and
c. may consider foreign law.
When this is the case, authority and usage are equally clear. The usage
is interpretation of the bill of rights and the authority of international law
is that of precedent that, although perhaps not binding, cannot be
ignored. The authority of foreign law is also that of non-binding
precedent, although it is precedent that need not be considered-similar
to the status of a court case from a different jurisdiction. The term
"must" in article 39(l)(b) indicates that international law constitutes
precedent, while the term "may" in 39(1)(c) indicates a permissive use
and implies a persuasive but not authoritative role for foreign law. The
foreign source doctrine is simply the Supreme Court's adoption of
article 39(1)(c) in relation to foreign law, international law, and foreign
opinion in the Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment questions
74
described above. 1
justice rooted in our traditions or right without which a "fair and enlightened system of justice" could
not exist.
172. The amount of authority possessed by a source might determine the array of uses to which
that source may be put in an opinion. Authority may, however, be constrained by pre-established
usages. And the use to which a source is put does reveal, at least for the purposes of the case under
consideration, the level of authority granted to that source. A binding precedent can hardly be invoked
by way of example in a case. It must be invoked as controlling authority and then may also be invoked
as an example. A source invoked for the comparative purpose of proving an example of how another
legal system has handled the issue under consideration by the court need not be given any authority
whatsoever.
173. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 39(1). Also of note along these lines, although more
responsive to the legislative context are sections 232-233 which state that customary international law
"is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament," id. ch. 14,
§ 232, and instructing courts to "prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent
with international law over any alternative interpretation." Id. § 233.
174. With 243 articles, the South African Constitution is far more specific than ours. And from its
age of just ten years, it follows that its text could explicitly take stock of conditions of recent import,
such as the growing importance of international human rights and the advent ofjudicial globalization. If
such conditions are to register in the U.S. Constitution, judicial interpretation is needed.
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In contrast to the South African Constitution, a use for foreign law
came about gradually in the United States through judicial interpretation
of amenable constitutional text. Foreign sources were cited only after a
use or purpose for them was established by caselaw, namely to help
determine (1) whether a given practice was unusual, or contravened
evolving standards of decency and human dignity, and (2) whether it
contravened a fundamental principle of justice rooted in our traditions or
right without which a "fair and enlightened system of justice" could not
exist. These Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment interpretations open the
door for the Supreme Court to use foreign sources for the purpose of
revealing how these interpretations apply in a given case. Thus, in the
United States, it all begins with usage, and this usage does not authorize
a level of authority for foreign sources that would permit their
consideration outside of the pre-determined contexts.
2. Constitutional Interpretation as the Sole Usage
The foreign source doctrine provides that foreign sources may be used
to interpret the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Due
Process Clause. This is all. In the Eighth Amendment, for example, one
sees a weak form of constitutional interpretation in that foreign law
merely confirms an existing domestic consensus. As the Court stated in
Roper, the "opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation of our
own conclusions."' 175 But even if foreign sources are only confirming an
already-existing domestic consensus in a "cruel and unusual
punishment" determination, they have persuasive authority.
Confirmation of the domestic consensus is sought not for the merely
ornamental 176 purpose of a rhetorical flourish, but rather as the doctrinal
consequence of an Eighth Amendment rooted in long-standing
jurisprudential interpretations that transcend U.S. territory: human
dignity and "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a
177
maturing society."'

A weaker and less significant form of constitutional interpretation
occurred in Lawrence, where the Court cited a European Court of
Human Rights case. The purpose of this citation was to assess claims
made in Bowers, an early Supreme Court case, about the treatment of
175. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
176. John Yoo suggests the possibility that the references to foreign decisions are merely
ornamental-that is, used by the Justices "merely to illuminate or decorate their opinions." Yoo, supra
note 6, at 385.
177. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 85, 100 (1958).

2007]

THE FOREIGNSOURCE DOCTRINE

1433

homosexuals in Western Civilization.
The Lawrence Court cited
international law in order to explain that Bowers was wrongly decided
on its own terms. It is not that a foreign decision overruled Bowers, but
rather that the international cases cited proved that Bowers misread the
status of the claim put forward in "our Western Civilization." Although
weak, this does count as a use of foreign law in constitutional
interpretation, because of Hurtado's and Palko's grounding of due
process in something broader than our domestic traditions led to the
claims made in Bowers. The reason this use of foreign law is considered
weak, despite its status as constitutional interpretation, is that it was
grounded in a specific empirical claim made by an earlier Supreme
Court decision. It is also weak because, as a general matter, its
relevance is limited to our historical tradition and to openness to-as
opposed to the compulsion of-Hurtado's "best ideas of other systems."
We must be careful not to confuse constitutional interpretation with
comparative legal analysis. Constitutional interpretation refers to the
task of interpreting a given section of text belonging to one country's
constitution. As seen above, portions of U.S. constitutional text are
permissive of citations to foreign sources, but those sources are used to
ascertain the meaning of U.S. constitutional text and Supreme Court
precedent interpreting that text. They are not used to understand the
differences and similarities between U.S. text and foreign text or to
understand the likely consequences of one regime or another. True
comparative analysis within the foreign source doctrine context occurs
only in Justices Breyer's and Steven's dissent in Printz. There, they
stated that other nations' "experience may nonetheless cast an empirical
light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem-in this case the problem of reconciling central authority with
the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller
constituent governmental entity."' 178 This is indeed a problem that
warrants a comparative approach, as it is complex and our country could
undoubtedly learn from how other countries have used law to reconcile
these competing needs.
The individual rights cases, on the other hand, do not present a
complicated legal problem. The Constitution either prohibits a certain
practice or it does not. The task undertaken by the Justices is quite
simply to determine the meaning of "evolving standards of decency" or
"fundamental principles of justice." When the Court looks to foreign
countries on the question of executing juveniles or banning homosexual
sodomy, it does so simply to survey whether these practices are

178. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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permitted or not. This is not comparative law in the doctrinal sense.
Rather, it is a simple survey. The Court is not looking to the social and
governmental consequences of banning these practices. It is merely
looking to the state of the law around the world to determine what is
cruel and unusual on the one hand and out of step with our traditions on
the other.
Comparative analysis, by contrast, would state something along the
lines of one approach's superiority over another for reasons made clear
from the experience of another nation. It is not true comparative
analysis simply to catalogue how many other nations execute juvenile
offenders and to conclude on this basis that the existing U.S. practice
was unusual. That others do or do not engage in a certain practice does
not make that practice any more or less cruel. It may, however, make
that practice more or less unusual. A judgment of unusualness is a
simple factual observation made pursuant to our constitutional text, not
pursuant to some insight derived from comparative legal analysis. In
Printz, however, the dissenters wished to determine how federalism
actually worked in other countries and to benefit from that foreign
experience in fashioning our own laws. This is a proposal, albeit an
unsuccessful one, for comparative legal analysis. Thus, the foreign
source doctrine does not involve comparative law.
It can be said, however, that a certain comparison does take place in
the Eighth Amendment context of a survey of foreign laws and in the
due process context of ascertaining our legal heritage. The Court
compares our practices to foreign practices to ascertain the state of
"evolving standards of decency" and to shed light on whether a given
practice is "unusual." The Court in Roe also took stock of foreign laws,
namely those associated with our legal tradition, as is required in the due
process context to assess consistency of a given right or prohibition
with
79
the principles of justice rooted in our traditions and conscience.'
Because of these legal hooks on which references to foreign sources
hang, it is logical that the foreign laws referenced by the Court would
affirm human rights. I call this practice of only citing foreign laws that
are more protective of human rights than the domestic practice under
consideration "comparing up." It is natural that the Court would
"compare up" instead of "comparing down."' 80 One commentator has
179. See discussion of Palko v. Connecticut, supra notes 113-119.

180. Roger P. Alford's concern that "a robust use of international sources could have the
unintended consequence of undermining rather than promoting numerous constitutional guarantees"
seems politically savvy, for the foreign source doctrine could indeed be hijacked by conservative judges;
however, this is unlikely given the disdain for which many social conservatives hold world opinion.
Furthermore, his concern is not doctrinally well-placed because of the impropriety of comparing down.
See Alford, supra note 6,at 58.
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contended that we must "take the bitter with the sweet."' 8 1 But to cite
the laws of the Congo, Saudi Arabia, or United Arab Emirates in
relation to the death penalty would accord neither with human dignity
nor with the evolving standards of decency that mark a maturing society.
These three countries still practice beheading. 182 To cite the laws of
Saudi Arabia or Iran on homosexuality, where it is an offense
punishable by death, 183 would not only be outside of our legal tradition,
but also outside the realm of any argument concerning conscience.
Fundamentally, the phenomenon of comparing up rather than down is
controlled by constitutional caselaw linking cruel and unusual
punishment to "evolving standards of decency," and due process to our
legal heritage.
Downward comparisons could be imagined, however, if it were some
day to pass that instead of lagging behind in its human rights practices
the United States lurched ahead. Such hypothetical formulations as
prison terms of more than ten years for murder being cruel and unusual
per se or the assertion of a due process right to have an abortion on
demand could certainly be rejected by virtue of downward comparisons
to foreign laws. This sort of downward survey comparison would show
that we were ahead of the evolving standards of decency and that tenyear prison terms for murder were certainly not unusual.
In sum, understanding the limited authority granted to foreign sources
should contribute to greater rationality in the legal debate. Judge
Posner's view on this topic is in this sense quite reasonable:
I do not suggest that our judges should be provincial and ignore what
people in other nations think and do. Just as our states are laboratories for
social experiments from which other states and the federal government
can learn, so are foreign nations' laboratories from whose legal
experiments we can learn. The problem is not learning from abroad; it is
authorities in U.S. cases, as if the
treating foreign judicial decisions as 84
world were a single legal community. 1
Judge Posner's objections arise only after foreign decisions are given a
certain amount of weight by U.S. courts. As explained above, the
foreign source doctrine does not treat foreign law and opinion as
181. Michael D. Ramsey challenges what he sees as a selective form of comparative law. Michael
D. Ramsey, InternationalMaterialsand Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 69, 70 (2004).
182. See Infoplease.com, Capital Punishment: Here & Abroad, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/
deathworldl.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
183. See SodomyLaws.org, Hate Crimes: Like the Taliban, America's Middle East Allies
(last
Tyrannize Gays and Women, http://www.sodomylaws.org/world/afghanistan/afnews006.htm
visited Feb. 17, 2007).
184. Posner, supra note 169, at 42.
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authoritative; rather, it treats them as informative and it does so for good
reasons.
D. Theories that Build on the Doctrine'sSpecificity
The following theories of the Supreme Court's use of foreign sources
help illustrate the contributions of the narrow, issue-by-issue analysis
offered in Part I and summarized in the preceding sections of Part II.
These theories posit that the foreign source doctrine can be explained by
any of the following: the Justices' political leanings, a lack of
governmental accountability to marginalized interests (such as those of
homosexuals and convicted criminals facing the death penalty), and
globalization. The application of these theories benefits from the narrow
analysis above. Context does in fact matter in this arena and broad
positions on this issue run a considerable risk of invalidity, or, at best,
fuzzy thinking.
1. The Justices' Politics
The easy answer, but for Eldred, would be that the Court has gotten it
right with regard to finding a normatively justifiable place for foreign
law in its decisions. Some parts of the Constitution, because of both text
and caselaw, invite comparative approaches (the Eighth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause), and others do not explicitly deny them
(federalism and the Copyright Clause). The first complication is that the
Eighth Amendment and Due Process doctrines presently allow
comparisons to any effect other than decreasing the rights of U.S.
citizens. The Court could have cited to the death penalty practices in
China and Turkey to show that the standard at issue in Atkins was not
cruel or unusual. If it wished to remain true to the language of
"evolving standards of decency," however, it could not, have citied to
those other nations' practices to show that our standards must be
lowered.
Though no doctrine in the Copyright Clause invites
constitutional comparisons, the "limited times" restriction would
similarly appear to forbid certain results-namely any permanent or
quasi-permanent extension of authors' rights. The federalism issue in
Printz varies from these other three areas of law, because no
constitutional provision was on point.
The second complication derives from the curious fact that the portion
of the Court most adverse to foreign law considerations was responsible
for the only constitutionally impermissible result obtained through
affirmative reference to foreign laws. One way to explain these two
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complications involves entertaining the common conceptions of the
justices' political leanings. The question is whether the palatability of
foreign law depends on the results it is used to achieve.
The Feeney Resolution 185 exemplifies how politics has been brought
to bear on the foreign source doctrine. The Resolution could very well
be based on a passage from Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott
v. Sanford, where the Court affirmed the validity of slavery under the
Due Process Clause. Taney remarked that
[n]o one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling... in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should
induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal
construction. .than 186
they were intended to bear when the instrument was
framed and adopted.
Chief Justice Taney's mandate was disobeyed in two subsequent Due
Process Clause cases, Palko v. Connecticut and Lawrence v. Texasdiscussed above. 187 These cases also fly in the face of the Feeney
Resolution.
Yet, Feeney's politicization of this matter is not entirely misplaced.
Politically liberal justices have indeed employed foreign sources in order
to increase human rights protections in Eighth Amendment and Due
Process cases or to decrease states' rights in the federalism context, but
have avoided such reference to foreign law in copyright extension where
it would lead to a smaller public domain. Conservative justices
predictably followed the opposite course. Normative legal reasons for
these positions bode mostly in favor of the liberals' positions, as
discussed above, but so do the instrumentalist or ideological reasons
mentioned here. This means the jurisprudence is both typical of a
"disembodied order," one separated 18
from
politics, and an "embodied
8
order," one ensconced in political life.
That Justice Scalia, of all the members of the Court, could join an
opinion (Eldred) that ignores the clear textual language of the
Constitution and focuses instead on legislative intent suggests the
dominance of ideology over legal principles. Not only was it legislative
intent, but it was legislative intent to consult the practices of foreign
nations. If there ever were a case where Justice Scalia should dissent,
185. See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
186. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,426 (1857).
187. See supra Part 1.
188. See Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 223, 225 (1981) ("[C]onstitutional order is seen as transcending-disembodied from-the clash of
wills and movement of passions that characterize day-to-day political life. It may then be enforced on
political life to discipline those wills and passions.").
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this was it.
In Printz, where no constitutional provision on point could be found
(unlike in Eldred), the Court should not have closed the door to
comparative legal analysis. While no argument can assert that the Court
would be obligated to look to foreign experience in the absence of a
constitutional command or legislative request, it is inappropriate to rule
out such an approach. The disagreement among the justices in this case
might-be seen as constitutive of either their commitment to comparative
legal analysis in the abstract or to their positions on handguns or
federalism. The analysis is indeterminate.
Indeterminacy also complicates Professor Koh's attempt to explain
the foreign source doctrine in terms of a split between the nationalists
and transnationalists on the Court. 18 9 A commitment to "territoriality,
extreme deference to national executive power and political institutions,
and resistance to comity or international law" would indeed constitute
the sort of "force or will" that Justice Scalia claims judges should not
have. Yet, his and Justice Thomas' opinions certainly do suggest such a
commitment. 190 Justice Scalia's reference to foreign law in Eldred can
be explained here on the basis of congressional intent that foreign law be
considered in order to extend copyright protections to domestic authors.
His lack of reference to foreign laws in Eighth Amendment cases does
speak to his commitment to nationalism because foreign laws
compromising human rights abound. In a sense, much foreign law
agrees with Justice Scalia's values, yet he does not wish to avail himself
of its support.
Still, the analysis is indeterminate because such foreign laws tend to
emanate from countries with poor human rights records. Citing to them
might prove politically disadvantageous.
Moreover, the caselaw
establishing constitutional tests of evolving standards of decency and
traditions of Western civilization militate against citations to such
countries' laws.
And although it is tempting to say that the
transnationalist judges citing to foreign laws are committed first and
foremost to openness to foreign views, it is disingenuous to separate
consideration of foreign law from the content of that law. It seems
doubtful, for example, that Justices Breyer and Ginsburg would consult
foreign law if there were no human-rights superior law to consult, or that
Palko and Trop would have contained the broad statement of
transcendental principles that they did if the world at large contained no
kindred nations to which our notions of human dignity and fundamental

189. Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Partof Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 52 (2004).

190. Id.
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principles of justice could be tied.
It would seem that political preferences in relation to foreign law per
se (nationalism vs. transjudicialism) are relevant, but the willingness of
conservative Justices to interpret our Copyright Clause on the basis of
foreign law detracts from this view. Admittedly, Eldred involved more
of a competition between our laws and European laws, such that the
majority hardly sought to affirm foreign law principles. Instead, the
majority affirmed American competitiveness and congressional intent.
Still, it was intent to interpret our Constitution in light of foreign
practice.
Because the analysis of the Justices' politics is indeterminate, we
must once again fall back on our case-specific understanding of how
constitutional meaning has evolved to include the limited uses of foreign
sources discussed above. The important textual and precedential
grounds for the foreign source doctrine seem far more verifiable and
amenable to principled analysis.
2. Process Theory
Continuing to test and explore the utility of the narrow approach at
the heart of this Article, we can ask whether rationales for judicial
review explain the consultation of foreign sources. It is noteworthy that
the Court has properly affirmed the relevance of foreign law and
practice only in the interpretation of "open textured"' 9 1 provisions, those
that "not only allow, but invite fluid adjustment to changing
circumstances."' 92 ("Limited times" is notably less textured than
'evolving standards of decency,' 'human dignity' or 'fundamental
principles of justice.') The controversy between the majority and
dissent in Atkins revolves around what type of changing circumstances
matters for constitutional analysis. The majority looked to evolving
standards of decency, an "evolving popular consensus,"' 93 instead ofas the dissenters would have it-the preponderance of legislative
decisions by states in a static sense.
Both measurements, however, are difficult to identify in comparison
to "an assessment of the responsiveness of government to particular
interests,"' 94 where a negative assessment justifies the anomaly of
judicial review.
The particular interests at hand are those of
191. See PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 31-43 (1975).
192. Parker, supra note 188, at 228 (discussing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980)).

193. Id. at 231.
194. ELY, supranote 192, at 63-69 (as cited in Parker, supra note 188, at 231).
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homosexuals, (Lawrence), the mentally retarded (Atkins), and juveniles
(Roper), or simply a subset of convicted murderers with regard to the
last two. If Justice Scalia is correct and the Lawrence majority was
"tak[ing] sides in the culture war, ' 95 this would be an appropriate place
to do so under Ely's conception of process theory. Query whether
assessing the responsiveness of government to the interests of
homosexuals or the mentally retarded is more "realistic and
determinate" than ascertaining the existence of a popular consensus
against capital punishment for the mentally retarded. 196 What is
important here is not which is easiest to measure, but how under settled
law constitutional interpretation must look to popular consensus in the
Eighth Amendment context, but need not do so in the Due Process
context.
Recall that Justice Scalia's allegation in the Eighth Amendment
context was not that the majority had taken sides in a culture war, but
that it had placed more weight on an international consensus than on the
national consensus.
This folds nicely into former Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concern over federalism, however, because it seems that the
Atkins majority-perhaps, in the interest of comity, humility, or
fomenting the rule of law in foreign nations-effectively gave political
input to international interests to which U.S. state governments are
unresponsive. The contours of the law are such that different processes
of constitutional interpretation will predictably arise in the language of
opinions in each area of law, but perhaps without a practical difference.
This is how Chief Justice Rehnquist's objection on federalism grounds,
though doctrinally misplaced, could be considered exceptionally astute.
Process theorists such as Choper and Ely consider the only valueneutral form of judicial review to be that of remedying barriers to
minority influence over government decisionmaking-that is, correcting
a procedural flaw in the political process, rather than "impos[ing]
'substantive' values on it.' 197 This "policing the system" approach to
judicial review is also thought to address "systemic" as opposed to "ad
hoc" malfunctioning. 198 Justice Scalia surely feels that a textual and
literalist approach to law is also value-neutral and of a systematic (as
opposed to "systemic") nature, but he cannot claim that a method of
195. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. See Parker, supra note 188, at 231.
197. Id., at 232. Cf LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 17 (1985) ("The crux of

any determination that a law unjustly discriminates against a group-blacks or women or even men-is
not that the law emerges from a flawed process or that the burden it imposes affects an independently
fundamental right, but that the law is part of a pattern that denies those subject to it a meaningful
opportunity to realize their humanity.").
198. Parker, supra note 188, at 232.
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judicial review accounts for the very necessity for judicial review. The
irony is that both rationales for judicial review were rejected by Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in the cases examined in Part I,
above. The significance of this point requires elaboration.
The Supreme Court currently consults foreign laws and practice in
constitutional interpretation that, depending on whether it occurs in the
context of the Eighth Amendment or Due Process, invokes two separate
rationales for judicial review. In the first context, the rationale is that of
injecting the substantive values of an emerging consensus, whereas, in
the second, the court corrected a flaw in the political process. What
precisely was the flaw in the anti-sodomy statute? Process theory does
not consider majoritarian politics to be a flaw. Rather, the flaw would
be a defect in the functioning of that system because of discrimination,
for example. In noting that the enforcement of the law served no
legitimate governmental interest, the Court deduced a political
malfunction. The "malfunctions" in Atkins and Roper, on the other
hand, would have been to allow the application of outmoded and
uncivilized value judgments to pass constitutional muster. This of
course is not, doctrinally speaking, a malfunction, but rather a practice
that has become "cruel and unusual" in relation to evolving standards of
decency.
The elasticity of Eighth Amendment doctrine was demonstrated when
the Court in Atkins noted quite openly that executing someone who is
mentally retarded would not serve the stated objectives of the criminal
law--deterrence or retribution. 199 This is at face value akin to noting
that the anti-sodomy law in Lawrence served no legitimate
governmental purpose and was therefore the result of a political
malfunction owing to prejudice. Yet, in Atkins and Roper, the absence
of a legitimate function made the laws "cruel," while in Lawrence the
same absence made the anti-sodomy law of inferior import than the
petitioner's liberty interests.
Though this elasticity and the seeming interchangeability of process
theory criteria casts doubt on their precision in these areas of law, it
cannot be said that the dissenters in these cases cared either way. The
dissent did not argue in Atkins or in Roper that political malfunctioning
had to be shown or that the substantive values asserted by the majority
were undesirable per se; rather, the dissent argued in both cases that the
judiciary could not strike down a law that formed part of a domestic
consensus, period. In Lawrence, the dissent argued that substantive
199. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) ("We are not persuaded that the execution
of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the
death penalty.").
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values relating to the prohibition of sodomy were irrelevant because
Bowers was not premised not on a tradition of prohibiting sodomy, but
200
rather on the lack of a tradition guaranteeing a right to engage in it.
The dissent here does not care about malfunctions in the political
process. Instead, it would require that the majority demonstrate a
substantive tradition of allowing sodomy or a fundamental right to
sodomy. Again, this demonstration would not be satisfactory if based
on the assertion of the Court's values; rather, it had to find a basis in the
Palko sense of our traditions and conscience.
Now the irony of the dissenters' position can be seen: It asserts a
judge-created prohibition on the activity of judges. How can there be
judicial review if neither a procedural nor substantive rationale for it
suffices?
The objection to foreign sources in these two cases, therefore, should
not be seen as relating to the use of foreign sources per se. Rather, it
relates to the use of that law to demonstrate either a substantive or
procedural need for judicial review. This rationale is difficult to absorb
because the dissenters in Atkins and Lawrence, and even Printz, framed
their objections to the use of foreign law in broad terms-that is, in
terms of the irrelevance of foreign law and practice to U.S. law. If we
look to Eldred, however, where consideration of foreign laws was
mandated by Congress (read, "not judicial review"), we see that
achieving international harmonization was more important than
respecting actual constitutional text. Here, Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined the Court in a decision that elevated the content
of foreign law and practice in the area of copyright above our own
Constitution's command on precisely the same subject.
The wonderful irony here is two-fold: First, Feeney's Resolution
would allow Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist to rely on
foreign laws in order to defeat any view of the original meaning of the
Copyright Clause simply because legislative history so permits; second,
the Resolution decries the Lawrence decision in its preamble, but later
permits the Court to rely on foreign law when such law "inform[s] an
understanding of the original meaning of the laws." The Due Process
Clause has been considered by the Court for at least a century to
comprise a notion of this country's tradition and a tie to the fundaments
of broader civilized society. How is the Court to ascertain the contours
of this tradition and broader society without reference to other nations?
A narrow approach has thus enabled us to surmise particular
relationships between foreign sources and judicial review that have
200. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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proved objectionable to the Lawrence, Atkins, and Roper dissenters.
Without the benefit of the narrow approach, these relationships could
not have been specified with sufficient precision. And without this, it
could not be understood that the broad objections to foreign law fail to
convey their authors' true meaning. Process theory affirms the validity
of the narrow approach, illustrating the roles played by foreign sources
in judicial review and how objections to judicial review may result in an
overly-generalized vilification of foreign sources.
3. Globalization of Our "Living Document"
Here, the narrow approach enables globalization to be disaggregated
into different content areas. How the Court will treat foreign law
depends on the area of law in which the case arises and, relatedly,
whether the composition of the Court permits the assertion of judicial
review. Judicial invalidation of legislative judgment is deemed most
acceptable in areas of individual rights and least acceptable in areas of
economic policy. Citation to foreign laws and experience is currently
allowed in the individual rights context and can therefore be deemed
symptomatic of the globalization of human rights cited by Justice
Breyer. 2 0 1 A similar reliance on foreign laws is also currently allowed in
the interest of harmonizing economic policy, as seen in Eldred's
treatment of copyright law. Matters of globalization are not implicated
in the Printz case, leaving little reason besides true disinterested
comparative analysis to consider foreign practices.
There is no
globalization of federalism that affects U.S. policy directly, but this is
certainly not the case for European nations. Human rights and national
economic policy, however, can forcefully insert themselves and related
foreign ideas into previously domestic areas of decision.
The vehicles for this insertion are not equally valid as a normative
constitutional matter, however. The open-textured language of Eighth
Amendment and Due Process jurisprudence is a normatively acceptable
vehicle. Pursuing the dictates of legislative history to the exclusion of
Article I, Section Eight of the Constitution is not normatively
acceptable. The presence of a globalizing influence in Eldred stretched
to greater absurdity a constitutionally mandated limit on copyright. The
absence of a globalizing influence is equally strong, however, defeating
a sensible claim to the virtues of comparative legal analysis in Printz.
Invalidating legislative judgments in the Eighth Amendment or Due
Process context has facilitated the globalization of human rights, since

201. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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the United States lags behind some nations in the areas of capital
punishment and, to a lesser extent, gay rights. Respecting legislative
judgments regarding the effects of foreign rules in the Commerce Clause
context, though in derogation of the Constitution's affirmative
commands, also facilitates globalization. The form of process theory
that accounts for this pattern can be labeled as a substantive or
procedural vindication of globalization. Its major limitation is that the
Court is not a uniform actor. Justices Stevens and Breyer most likely
have a preference for individual rights over majoritarian politics, while
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas quite possibly have the opposite
preference-all irrespective of globalization.
This theory's only chance for vindication lies with disaggregating
globalization-for example, separating the globalization of human
rights, from the globalization of intellectual property norms. This
uncoupling of globalization is facilitated by the narrow analysis
conducted in Part I and affirms the descriptive validity of the foreign
source doctrine as described.
The preceding sections illustrate that the foreign source doctrine is
best understood as the product of gradual common law development
that, although certainly not divorced from politics (the politics of
judicial review and globalization included), is firmly rooted in
constitutional text and caselaw. It should also now be clear that the
foreign source doctrine applies in very specific circumstances and is
quite circumscribed. Indeed, the practice of consulting foreign sources
must not be regarded as one-dimensional or a proper subject for easy
argument or broad conclusions standing alone. The great enemy of the
foreign source doctrine, and the principal obstacle to its comprehension,
is this type of reliance on a broad position on the relevance of foreign
sources to constitutional interpretation. Recall that a broad approach
states either that foreign sources are always relevant to interpreting the
Constitution or that foreign sources are never relevant. A broad position
tends to come in the form of a "thick theory" justifying a broad view on
the basis of deep-seeded legal or social assumptions. As seen below,
these broad approaches do more harm than good, unless they account for
and arise from a detailed understanding of the constitutional practice that
has been painstakingly describe above.

III. PROBLEMS WITH BROAD POSITIONS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONGRESS
Broad approaches to the issue of foreign sources have been common,
despite finding a lack of support in the caselaw. Members of Congress,
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the Justices themselves, and commentators are prone to making broad
claims, and have suggested that foreign and comparative analyses have
no place in the Court's jurisprudence or, conversely, that they may be
central to the future of U.S. constitutional law. Such generalized
conversations arouse fears and ignore the reality of what has occurred,
making debate on the appropriateness of foreign sources either
uninformed or inaccessible.
A. The Justices
Justice Scalia, in a public debate with Justice Breyer, noted the
selective nature of the foreign sources surveyed in Lawrence. At the
outset of course, he should have known that the international judicial
decisions surveyed responded directly to the task of an earlier foreign
reference made in Bowers, a decision with which he agrees. In any case,
Justice Scalia accused the majority of selectively citing to foreign law
instead of considering the practice of all foreign nations, not just those
whose practices concord with the majority's views. He surmised that no
other country applies the Exclusionary Rule, and asked why the Court
should not therefore say "Oh my, we're out of step" and do away with
the Rule. 2 Of course no principled basis for citing foreign sources in
the context of the Exclusionary Rule had been suggested, and thus
Justice Scalia's suggestion reflects a lack of awareness regarding the
foreign source doctrine. In any case, he continued as follows: "[T]ake
our abortion jurisprudence: we are one of only six countries in the world
that allows abortion on demand at any time prior to viability[-]should
we change that because other countries feel differently? '20 3 Justice
Scalia is right to point out that the majority in Roper and Atkins
"compares up," rather than "comparing down"--that is, they discuss
foreign laws that are more rights-protective than the U.S. laws at issue in
the cases.
This comment misunderstands the purpose to which foreign sources
are put. No doctrine holds that the U.S. Constitution should generally
bend to the practices of the world community. Whether those practices
are common or rare is immaterial. Justice Scalia is responding to what
he sees as a thick theory of foreign sources that would evaluate all areas
of constitutional law in accordance with other nations' practices and
mandate that our practices be kept in line with either the majority of
202. Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, Debate on
Foreign Law at U.S. Association of Constitutional Law meeting at American University (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts.

203. Id.
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foreign states or with some preferred minority of foreign states. In any
case, this thick theory finds no support in the Constitution. It is
nonetheless discernable from the comments of certain pro-foreign law
Justices and this is precisely the problem with the public debate on this
issue, even among the Justices themselves. It lacks careful attention to
detail and contains an abundance of sweeping statements likely to
inspire fear and misunderstanding.
The same could be said for Chief Justice Roberts' comments during
his confirmation hearings. When questioned on the use of foreign law,
he called it "a misuse of precedent" and noted that "[i]n foreign law, you
can find anything you want," implying that there were no standards
regarding which laws could be cited and for what purpose such citations
could be made.2 °4
He thus ignored the important textual and
precedential foundations of the foreign source doctrine described in
Parts I and II above.
Other Justices have espoused broad positions in favor of the doctrine.
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist was, somewhat surprisingly given his
dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, the first to speak publicly on
the need for comparative constitutional analysis in the Court: "Now that
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time
that the United States court begin looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process. 2 °5
Justices O'Connor, 20 6 Breyer, 20 7 and Ginsburg 20 8 have made comments
to the same effect. Justice Breyer, for example, stated that the Court
"find[s] an increasing number of issues, including constitutional issues,
where the decisions of foreign courts help by offering points of
204. See Mears, supra note 4.
205. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Constitutional CourtsComparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND
FuTuRE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMpoSIuM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds.,

1993).
206. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address
Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, in 96 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) (opining that "[w]hile ultimately we must bear responsibility for
interpreting our own laws, there is much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given
thought to the same difficult issues that we face here.").
207. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, The Supreme Court and the New
International Law, Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/inthecourts/Supreme_
CourtNewInterlLawJustBreyer/o20.pdf.

208. Id. at I ("[C]omparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting
constitutions and enforcing human rights. We are the losers if we neglect what others can tell us about
endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups.") (quoting Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Affirmative Action as an InternationalHuman Rights Dialogue, 18 BROOKINGS REV. 2,
3 (2000)).
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comparison., 20 9 Does he mean to say that foreign law should be
consulted in other areas in addition to those already seen? Such broad
statements certainly give cause for concern such as that expressed by
Justice Scalia above.
Additional broad rationales for the foreign source doctrine cited by
the Justices include, "the 'globalization' of human rights" and increasing
consensus on human rights matters,2 10 the ability of the United States to
foment the rule of law in other countries,2 1 and a change in the United
States' "island" or "lone ranger" mentality, leading to an increased
interest in comity and humility. 212 Again, such comments, although
perhaps accurate, are dangerously incomplete and lack any sort of
limiting principles, such as those discussed in Parts I and II of this
Article.
The Justices have indeed exercised varying degrees of caution in
framing their comments. Justice Breyer was careful to spell out that
"[i]t is neither that we are, in any political sense, 'internationalists,' nor
2 13
are we trying to move the law in a particular substantive direction."
He also specified that it is still the U.S. Constitution that the Court 2 is
14
interpreting and that the Justices will not "blindly follow" foreign law.
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, made less qualified statements that
did in fact lead to confusion and fear embodied in the Feeney
Resolution. She predicted that "with time, we will rely increasingly on
international and foreign law in resolving what now appear to be purely
209. Id. at 2.
210. Id. ("This change reflects the 'globalization' of human rights, a phrase that refers to the everstronger consensus (now near world-wide) as to the importance of protecting basic human rights, the
embodiment of that consensus in legal documents, such as national constitutions and international
treaties, and the related decision to enlist judges-i.e., independent judiciaries-as instruments to help
make that protection effective in practice.").
211. See Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies,
(Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor transcript.pdf, at 2 (commenting
that "[w]hen U. S. courts are seen to be cognizant of other judicial systems, our ability to act as a ruleof-law model for other nations will be enhanced.").
212. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Looking Beyond Our
Borders: The Value of Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Sherman J. Bellwood
Lecture (Sept. 18, 2003), in 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). ("The 1776 Declaration of
Independence ... expressed concern about the opinions of other peoples.., out of 'a decent Respect to
the Opinions of Mankind."'); id. at 8 ("[O]ur 'island' or 'lone ranger' mentality is beginning to
change."); id. at 10-11 ("1 ... believe we will continue to accord 'a decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind' as a matter of comity and in a spirit of humility.").
213. Breyer, supra note 207, at 1.
214. Id. ("[C]omparative use of foreign constitutional decisions will not lead us blindly to follow
the foreign court. As I have said before-'[o]f course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not
those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural differences between their
systems and our own. But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences
of different solutions to a common legal problem."').
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2 15

B. The Congress
Together with the caselaw examined above, the Justices' public
2 16
statements and judicial opinions have led to the Feeney Resolution,
which is intended to overrule the foreign source doctrine. As if to leave
no doubt as to the Feeney Resolution's impetus, the notice for the
legislative hearing on the Resolution quoted Justice O'Connor's
prediction regarding the Court's increasing use of foreign law in
domestic cases.217

Eldred v. Ashcroft motivated the allowance made in the Resolution
regarding legislative history.2 18 Ironically, however, the decision in
Eldred contravenes any reasonable conception of the original meaning
of the "for limited times" language in the Copyright Clause. 219 Similarly
ironic is the fact that a strong case can be made that what have (wrongly)
been considered the Court's most controversial usages of foreign lawsthose occurring in recent Eighth Amendment and Due Process cases-fit
within the Resolution's broad exception relating to an "understanding of
original meaning." Since the Resolution fails to account for Palko and
Trop, never mind the history behind the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, its purported normative concern for constitutional
principles can hardly be taken seriously.
In his interview with MSNBC, Representative Feeney exhibited a
similar lack of understanding of the weight afforded to foreign sources
and the fact that consultation of foreign sources is appropriate only in
certain areas: "[I]t is improper for [the courts] to substitute foreign law
215. O'Connor, supra note 206, at 351.

Strangely, she followed this up with a doctrinally

incorrect statement regarding the relevance of foreign practice to the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence that would point in the opposite direction from her prediction. Id.("Until now, however,
we have always held that when interpreting the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment, under the
Eighth Amendment, only national norms are relevant."). This is patently incorrect, at least as a
descriptive assessment. See supra Part 1.

216. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
217. See Notice of Hearing on Feeney/Goodlatte Resolution, http://www.judiciary.house.gov/
legacy/news0324.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
218. See 537 U.S. 186, 205-206 (2003) (explaining how Congress intended the Act to give

American authors the same level of copyright protection afforded to European authors and to avoid
competitive disadvantages vis-A-vis foreign rightholders. This case deals with the unification and
standardization of intellectual property law for the purposes of international trade and commerce, but
what is significant for our purposes is that the Justices looked to foreign law only to the degree
Congress, through the vehicle of legislative history, had instructed them to do so).
219. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [tlo promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). See also supra Part II.C.
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for American law or the American Constitution. '220 He then went on to
suggest that judges who indulge in this impropriety should be
impeached. 22 1 As we have seen, the Court is not substitutingforeign law
for our law; rather, it is interpreting our law and it may simply be
beyond the comprehension of social conservatives that their Constitution
and their founding fathers cannot in every case be properly
comprehended without attention to the world at large. The point is not
where the ideas came from, but rather who ultimately decides their
value. Where our duly-appointed Supreme Court Justices believe they
can learn something from foreign experience and they do so in the
context of permissive, open-textured constitutional language and longstanding caselaw, it makes little sense to fear that they have delegated
decisional authority to foreigners or substituted foreign law for U.S. law.
It may actually be the case that they are exercising their duty to uphold
the Constitution itself and that the foreign source doctrine is the result of
this sincere attempt to faithfully apply our law. Moreover, it is in fact a
valid application of our law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foreign source doctrine has triggered some of the angriest and
most sarcastic dissenting opinions in the history of the Court. Rabid
disagreement, shrill voices, and inflamed sensibilities abound. This is
not to say, however, that the issue should not be controversial, the
disagreement not rabid, the voices not shrill, and sensibilities not
inflamed, for one of the greatest controversies on the entire subject of
constitutional interpretation is in fact implicated. This is the question of
whether the Constitution is a living document. The foreign source
doctrine is made possible by the Supreme Court majority's acceptance
of the living document philosophy, that is whether the Constitution can
accommodate changing values and conditions within American society,
or, indeed, changing conditions in the world order. This formulation
raises a subsidiary question within the living document theory. One may
accept the premise that the Constitution's meaning can evolve over time
without accepting that this evolving meaning may be in any part
discerned through reference to foreign or international sources. The
issue does not necessarily concern the original intent of the framers of
the Constitution, for their original intent may have been for the
Constitution to evolve along with the nation,22 2 and they, in drafting the
220. Curry, supra note 2.
221. Id.
222. See Powell, supra note 95
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Constitution most certainly consulted foreign views.2 23 Debates about
the relevance of foreign experience to constitutional interpretation
involve disagreement about whether the Constitution is a living
document, and, second, additional controversy about the propriety of
this particular way of breathing life into its text. Although I have
confined my analysis to the latter, the narrower of the two issues, I must
at least mention its relationship to this broader point of contention.
Where for over fifty years, majorities and dissenters have engaged in
back-and-forth debate over whether due process and cruel and unusual
punishment are protections that march forward or march backward,
some honesty about law seems warranted. At issue are open-textured
provisions--constitutional language that is brief and imprecise in its
meaning. Examples of what is cruel and unusual are not given in the
Constitution, as they would be in any code that purported to be absolute
and unequivocal in its meaning. Furthermore, the Constitution nowhere
specifies how it is to be interpreted. The dissenters' and Representative
Feeney's position, even if original intent did weigh in their favor, seeks
to derive comfort and legitimacy by removing choice. Yet, were their
views to be adopted wholesale by all, this would constitute a choicenamely, a choice to ignore the roots and structure of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and to contravene many decades of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. This choice would not give due consideration to
the fundamental norms of human dignity and the principles of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.
The foreign source doctrine is properly employed in areas of
constitutional law where the text is open-textured and the precedent is
amenable to it. As far as the meaning of the Bill of Rights is concerned,
however, the obvious architecture at hand is one that counsels the
protection of unpopular minorities, the evolution of human decency,
and, of course, reflection on our country's cultural values. It does not
follow, however, that this reflection need be limited to the most
traditional subset of those values. As our society evolves, so does our
law. The foreign source doctrine is not so out of step with our society as
to be abusive of the Constitution as a living document. In fact, it seems
perfectly in step with precedent and constitutional text. Further, the
doctrine's application in Bill of Rights cases supports the purposes for
which our Union was established in the first place-to ensure an end to
tyranny, and to secure for all the rights to Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.

223. See Koh, supra note 87.
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But I do not intend to say much about the policy debate here. This
Article was intended to convey only half of the picture, the portion that
reveals constitutional permissibility. I believe we should gaze upon this
half before moving to the other portion which depicts the related matters
of political and social desirability.2 24 Now that the salient aspects of the
Supreme Court's use of foreign sources in domestic cases have been
brought to light, it is indeed time to ask why the foreign source doctrine
has gained prominence and whether it is desirable. Perhaps now we can
ask these questions unencumbered by the accusations of illegality levied
by unlettered legislators and incensed dissenting Justices. But as we ask
larger questions-for example, those pertaining to the effects of the
foreign source doctrine on sovereignty, individual rights, democratic
legitimacy, the role of judges, and international relations-we must
ensure that our answers account for the legal subtleties of the
phenomenon with which we claim to be concerned. I do not contest the
need for us, as a legal community, to consider the issue more broadly. I
merely suggest that we ought to construct this debate, which is by nature
relatively volatile and ideological, on top of more principled and dutiful
lines of analysis. This Article is intended as a step in that direction.

224. See TRIBE, supra note 197, at 268 ("We must make choices but must renounce the equally
illusory freedom to choose however we might wish to choose. For it is a Constitution ... in whose
terms we are, after all, choosing. And that is the paradox, the mystery, of the struggle we cannot avoid
if it is the Constitution, and not solely our own priorities, that we would choose to follow .. ").

1452

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAWREVIEW

[Vol.75

